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Abstract 
 
 
 
The Tcard was first promised in time for the 2000 Sydney Olympics, but serious 
implementation plans only started in 2003 when the company ERG was contracted to deliver 
the Tcard. An amendment bill was passed to establish an organisation to overlook the 
technical rollout of the Tcard and massive financial investment followed. However, the 
Tcard was never implemented and the contract with ERG was cancelled in 2008. Meanwhile 
other global cities – Tokyo, Hong Kong, Seoul, London as well as other Australian cities 
have successfully implemented smartcard systems over the last two decades. This study uses 
two theoretical frameworks to find out what caused the failure of Tcard implementation. 
Both frameworks reveal that the key actors’ decisions to leave pre-existing legacy fares and 
bureaucratic structures led to the failure. The study also uncovers beyond the direct findings 
of the two frameworks, exposing that key actors failed to reform pre-existing structures due 
to their confinement in electoral interests, causing policy myopia and a major 
misunderstanding of public demands on transportation.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The Tcard Story in Brief 
The smartcard is a plastic card with a microprocessor chip connected to an 
antenna. A reading device then deducts the cash stored in the smartcard within ten 
centimetres of placement. The card is ‘waved’ as passengers board and alight from 
transport services and a transaction takes place within 0.3 seconds (Lomax 2005, p.10). 
Smartcards are used as a replacement for conventional paper tickets and are considered 
global best practice, saving passengers’ time and resources (Global Smart 2008).  
Figure01.1 Hong Kong’s Octopus Card 
 
Source: (Visiting Asia, 2011). 
 
The idea of implementing a smartcard first came on the agenda for Sydney in the 
mid 1990s, with increasing population density and demand for better public transport 
Reader emits electromagnetic waves 
to detect antenna on smartcard. 
 
 
Once detected, fare is deducted within 
0.3 seconds 
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(Glazebrook 2009, p.8; Smith 2003, p.17-24). There were also concerns over air quality 
and congestion, (Smith 1998) and with the 2000 Olympic Games approaching, a simple 
integrated ticketing system was an attractive policy (NSW Legislative Council 1997, 
p.54).  
 
The then NSW Public Transport Authority (which will be referred to as ‘the 
Department’) only addressed the smartcard agenda seriously in 2000 and finally 
contracted a subsidiary of ERG, Integrated Transit Solutions Limited (ITSL), (which will 
be referred to as ERG) in 2003 to deliver the smartcard system (Ministry of Transport 
2004, p.83). The smartcard was labeled ‘Tcard’ and the Department’s policy arm, the 
Transport Administration Corporation (TAC) headed the project (Ibid). 
 
The first signs of implementation came about in July 2004 when a trial of the 
Tcard commenced with 7,000 school students on three private bus operators. This was 
called the School Student Transport Scheme (SSTS) (Ministry of Transport 2005, p.72). 
In March 2006, the Transport Administration Amendment (PTTC) 2006 (NSW) Bill 
(which will be referred to as ‘the Amendment Bill’) was passed to create the Public 
Transport Ticketing Corporation (PTTC). The PTTC’s role was to ensure the technical 
rollout of the Tcard (PTTC 2007, p.3).  Assuming that the Tcard would be successfully 
implemented, the Department planned to commercialise the PTTC and become its main 
shareholder (Transport Administration Amendment (PTTC) 2006 (NSW), Part 3B).  
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However, by 2007 there were some major complications between the PTTC and 
ERG with significant delays in the Tcard project (Besser and Sexton, 2007). By 2008, 
PTTC dissolved the contract with ERG, which led to a court case (Besser 2007). PTTC 
accused ERG of failing to meet critical milestones and providing an assurance plan that 
guaranteed confidence for delivery within a reasonable timeframe and budget (PTTC v 
ITSL and Anor (2009) NSWSC S54). ERG in response, accused the PTTC of failing to 
reform fares despite its necessity for ticketing reform, failing to provide adequate 
information, communication, and adding tasks beyond the contracted agreement (Ibid). 
The case still remains in court and the Department has signed a new contract with Cubic 
Transportation Systems (Aston, 2010). The next attempted implementation of the Tcard 
is scheduled to start in 2014 (Besser, 2008).  
 
1.2 So What? Why Should We Care?  
 
The Tcard has been a policy that has been highly demanded by many public 
transport users. A series of public discussions called ‘City Talks’ concerning the future of 
Sydney was held in the early 2000s. Hosted by city sponsors in partnership with the 
Sydney Morning Herald, the discussions revealed that Sydneysiders were frustrated with 
their archaic, inefficient and disconnected public transport system (NSW Legislative 
Assembly 2006, p.20808). Member of Parliament (MP) Clover Moore summed up public 
demands by asking:  
“Why are we waiting for an efficient, environmentally and passenger-friendly 
public transport system? Why are we putting our country's number one 
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economic driver, the city of Sydney, at risk with a transport system that is 
failing?” (Ibid)  
 
She made clear that the system for collecting fares and changing transport modes 
was primitive and made public transport journeys frustrating and slow. Moore stated that 
the introduction of the Tcard would be central to building an efficient system, aimed to 
take cars off the road (Ibid). The Tcard policy was a logical solution, enhancing the 
opportunity to address climate change, rising oil prices and a growing population density.  
 
Despite this, the Department had invested heavily in motorways over the last two 
decades; the Harbour Tunnel, the M2, M4, M5, M7, the Eastern Distributor, Cross City 
Tunnel, and the Lane Cove Tunnel just to name a few (Glazebrook 2009, p.8). During 
that time only six new stations were opened and two busways were completed in Sydney 
(Ibid). As a result, Sydneysiders have a heavy reliance on private vehicles. Kilometres 
travelled per capita have been increasing since 1991, and in 2002, 70 per cent of trips 
were made by car (National Institute for Labour studies et. al. 2010, p.224; Smith 2004, 
p.17). This is unfortunate as cars cost around 86c per passenger kilometre, compared to 
47c for trains and 57c for buses (Glazebrook 2009, p.8). 
 
The good news though, is that Sydneysiders care. They are concerned enough to 
contribute to the debate on improving public transport. Residents take Sydney’s transport 
problems seriously, labelling congestion as the most critical problem and want to see 
stronger long-term planning and investment (Smith 2004, p.40). While there is a long to-
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do list for the NSW State government, a clever place to start is by boosting public 
transport patronage by introducing smartcards. Smartcards are designed to benefit 
travellers by cutting queues for buying and swiping tickets, and save time and money 
(Carter, 2005). Carbon emissions will decrease as cities with strong public transport 
systems, especially based on rail-use, significantly lower the Gigajoules (GJ) of fuel 
consumed per person (Newman 2006, p.3). For instance American and Australian cities 
use 30-80 GJs per person compared to 5-15 in Asian cities like Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Tokyo (Ibid). Many global cities such as New York, Paris, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Tokyo and Seoul have already adopted the smartcard and have much more advanced 
transport systems when compared to Sydney (Edwards and Smith 2008, p.1-3). The 
Tcard was an attractive policy solution for environmental and population sustainability 
which were the main problems that needed to be addressed.  
 
1.3 Puzzle and Methodology 
The key question this paper seeks to address is: what led to the failure of the 
Tcard implementation? On the surface, the Tcard seemed to have all the necessary 
elements in order for policy implementation to occur smoothly. There were no anti-Tcard 
actors present, a new Amendment Bill enacting the policy was passed and a new 
organisation overlooking the implementation was established. What was missing and 
what went wrong?  
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Two different theoretical frameworks have been used to answer this question. Eric 
Patashnik’s model essentially argues that in order for policy to be successfully 
implemented, former political structures such as iron triangles, opposing parties and pre-
existing markets must be destroyed (Patashnik, 2008). The reasoning behind the need to 
eliminate pre-existing structures is that newer structures can be created on a clean slate so 
that interruptions caused by old modus operandi are diminished, and a ‘whole new game’ 
is established (Ibid, p.32). While Patashnik’s framework analyses the necessary 
construction of the cumulative ‘implementation machine’ he extends his attention to the 
need for disassembly (Ibid, p.5). I refer to this model as Patashnik’s Disassembly 
Framework (PDF). This framework helps with the development of my argument that the 
presence of complex legacy pre-reform fare structures and segregated transport operators 
played an integral role, leading to the Tcard failure. However, this framework is not 
inclusive of an international comparative perspective and leaves open the question of how 
smartcards have been adopted elsewhere but not in Sydney. What have other global cities 
done for their smartcard policies to work? More importantly, Patashnik’s model does not 
provide answers for the follow up question of why fares were not reformed and transport 
operators not streamlined.  
 
In order to fill the gaps that Patashnik leaves exposed, David Dolowitz and David 
Marsh’s Policy Transfer Framework (PTF) has been used as a complementary 
framework. Dolowitz and Marsh’s main argument is that policy transfer between 
countries is common practice but this exercise may contribute to the failure of a policy if 
done in an incomplete, inappropriate or uninformed manner (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 
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p.17-20). PTF assesses this through analysing how one policy from one place had been 
transferred to another; the different actors involved; different degrees of transfer, their 
motivations, what is transferred and what has restricted or facilitated the transfer (Ibid, 
p.5-6).  I have selected Hong Kong (HK) to use as the parallel case study as Sydney 
positioned itself as the transferee city of HK’s Octopus smartcard. HK’s Octopus 
smartcard has been the benchmark model to copy as explicitly referred to by key decision 
makers in the Tcard case; in addition, the same company, ERG, was contracted (Li 2008, 
p.7). The use of PTF reveals that the failure to reform fares is inextricably linked to the 
failure to establish a single transport operator. Like Patashnik, though, Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s model also does not directly uncover why a single unified transport operator was 
not established and hence, why fares could not be addressed. I discuss this question of 
why fare reform and a streamlined transport operator was not established later on in the 
thesis.  
 
Both frameworks use similar research methods and techniques, taking a historical 
narrative approach, comprised of the critical analysis of government documents, 
newspaper articles, websites, reports, press releases, minutes and other theses. While 
interviews are a common methodology in the above approaches, they have not been 
conducted in this study, as the Tcard issue has had substantial coverage by the media and 
useful evidence was available via court cases and public inquiries. Interviews were also 
not feasible for the Hong Kong case study due to lack of resources, accessibility to 
relevant authorities, and language barriers.  
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In sum, through applying the two policy analysis frameworks, I pose the argument 
that the decision to keep pre-existing legacy fare structures and segregated bureaucratic 
structures led to the Tcard implementation failure. In this sense, this paper is set upon 
foundational and positivist grounds, and the greater purpose of this study is to promote 
success and prevent failures in future implementation of transport policy. Underlying this 
goal is my advocacy for a better public transport system aligned to international best 
practice, that allows for the development of a society better-suited to reduce ecological 
footprint.  
 
1.4 Literature Review: Filling the Gap 
A bi-level analysis of the Tcard implementation failure using Patashnik’s 
Disassembly Framework (PDF) and Policy Transfer Framework (PTF) is certainly a 
novel approach. In order to illustrate this, I will firstly overview the present policy 
implementation literature and why it cannot adequately explain what led to the failure of 
the Tcard. Secondly, I will outline the relevance of the two frameworks to this study by 
outlining the key policy implementation theorists and their traditional propositions. I pose 
the argument that the bulk of implementation theory concentrates on what is needed in 
the cumulative creation of an ‘implementation machine’ and the prime emphasis remains 
on the slippage between politicians and bureaucratic actors as a possible cause of failure 
(Patashnik 2008, p.5). I will then illustrate how these gaps can be filled with PDF by 
focusing on the need for disassembly and the slippage between the politicians and 
citizenry. I will also highlight the wisdom PTF can provide in confirming and building 
insights on the causes of Tcard implementation failure, considering smartcards have been 
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an international phenomenon delivered successfully to a number of other cities by ERG. 
Lastly, I will highlight the lack of policy implementation analyses paired with smartcard 
technology. Smartcard literature has largely been confined to the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) discipline. I will shed light on the absence of policy 
implementation literature being applied on smartcard transit technology despite its 
increasing international dominance and trend, attracting major capital investment and 
transforming lifestyles.  
 
Implementation theorists have long lamented the fact that there are simply too 
many variables that contribute to policy success or failure and realise that it is impossible 
to map a blueprint model for either (Matland, 1995). In the past, over 300 variables were 
identified in over 100 implementation studies (Heinrich and Lynn 2000, p.114; O’Toole 
1986, p.184). But amongst these discoveries, two large groups within the literature have 
emerged, advocating the most important factors that determine policy success and failure. 
The first are Top-Down theorists (TDs) (Matland 1995, p.146-7). TDs include Sabatier, 
Mazmanian, Van Meter and Van Horn who believe that central actors make decisions 
that must reach the bottom clearly and effectively (Ibid). TDs prescribe clear, detailed 
policy goals, better communication throughout the hierarchy, limited change and optimal 
utilisation of bureaucracies (Matland 1995, p.148). TDs mostly blame the incompetence 
or intentional resistance of bureaucracies or technical issues as causes of policy failure, 
and award principal decision makers as the key agents who are able to control the system 
and direct it towards success (Winter 1990, p.28-9). The main flaw with TDs is that there 
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is a huge bias and dependence on these key agents as those who can guarantee successful 
policy implementation (Ibid).   
 
On the other hand, Bottom-Up theorists (BUs) such as Berman, Hjern, Hull and 
Lipsky focus on the people who are most immediate to the policy’s impacts and argue 
that if the local-level implementers of policy are dissatisfied or not given enough 
discretion to adapt the policy, implementation will fail (Matland 1995, p.148). Thus they 
advise that decisions be made at the local level and embraced also by those at the top of 
the decision-making ladder. The division between TDs and BUs can be quite extreme. 
Kaufman states that if we just change the handful of high-officials, then the actions of 
their hundreds or thousands of employees will change (Elmore 1979, p.609), whereas 
Lipsky and Weathers claim that street-level bureaucrats have the final power to make or 
break implementation (Matland 1995, p.149). What is common to both groups, though, is 
the emphasis on the relationship between the decision makers and the bureaucracies, and 
the necessary creation of an ‘implementation machine’ (Bardach 1977, p.57). Both have 
an underlying cumulative approach naming a variety of factors such as the need for 
establishing clear goals, strong coalitions, new enforcement agencies and technologies 
(Matland 1995, p.149-154).  
 
Implementation theory is continually evolving and making efforts to synthesize 
the two groups and have generated overarching key factors that determine the fate of 
policy implementation. Winter stated that key factors include policy design, 
organisational behaviour, street-level bureaucrats and responses by target groups (Winter 
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1990). Matland also advocated the ambiguity-conflict model, in which low ambiguity and 
low conflict is the optimal model for heightening the probability of implementation 
success (Bardach 1977; May 1991; Matland 1995). However, in the Tcard case, while 
enactment was successful, real implementation was never achieved, so there is no way of 
analysing how bureaucratic agencies; Sydney Ferries, RailCorp and State Transit 
Authority (STA) prevented or allowed Tcard implementation when they never even 
witnessed Tcard machines being mounted. Furthermore, there was no bureaucratic revolt 
against the Tcard – How can the Tcard implementation failure be diagnosed with a TD or 
BU lens when the Tcard never came into physical actualisation? What role did the 
bureaucrats play, when the Tcard was under the exclusive direction of the Minister of the 
Department and only he could access the PTTC? Despite successfully enacting the Tcard 
policy and establishing a new organisation to roll out the Tcard, the fact that it never 
really came into physical actualisation, suggests that critical elements in the policy were 
missing a priori ‘implementation machine’.  
 
Patashnik’s Disassembly Framework (PDF) provides a more fitting answer for the 
causes of the Tcard failure. Published in 2008, Patashnik’s work is relatively new in the 
implementation literature. Patashnik divides the policy process into two phases; he 
suggests that the first phase of getting policy enacted is like losing weight, which is a 
difficult challenge, but the second phase of implementing policy is equally as tough, as it 
was all about keeping the weight off (Patashnik 2008, p.3). While traditional 
implementation theory has added significant wisdom on what type of policy or 
implementation machine heightens the chance of implementation success, it does not 
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address the need for disassembly which is the need for an overhauling or reconstituting of 
the older, pre-existing policy machine or system – which Patashnik focuses on (Ibid, p.5). 
Furthermore, Patashnik applies cases specifically on General Interest Reform (GIR), 
which refers to policy reforms intended to distribute benefits for the general public 
(Patashnik 2008, p.11-2) rather than a certain target group. Thus rather than emphasizing 
the gap between politicians and their bureaucratic agents, there is more focus on the 
commitment gap between politicians and citizenry (Ibid). The Tcard was a GIR as it 
intended to improve the efficient use and service of transport for the general public. The 
strength of Patashnik’s theory is that it does not dismantle the wealth of ‘implementation 
machine’ prescriptions built up by former scholars but simply extends beyond that.  
 
Patashnik’s main argument is that for reform to stick, there must be a complete 
reconfiguration of political dynamics. This involves the reconfiguration of long-standing 
patterns, institutions and monopolies in order for new structures to be established 
effectively (Patashnik 2008). Patashnik provides three criteria that must be addressed in 
order for successful policy implementation. These include the transformation of political 
structures, creative destruction of existing markets and positive policy feedback (Ibid, 
p.3-4, 26-9). He then categorises different policy reforms into degrees of stickiness: 
reversal, erosion, dug-in and reconfiguration (in ascending order of stickiness) (Ibid, 
p.32). Patashnik has combined the fruits of former implementation scholars and his own 
to effectively address the question of what leads to implementation success or failure.  
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By understanding the international nature of smartcards and the regular 
comparison of transportation practices in different countries, the policy transfer 
framework is a necessary place to look for help in understanding what went wrong in the 
Tcard policy. Dolowitz and Marsh, the key thinkers behind PTF, argue that policy 
transfer is an increasingly relevant trend that deserves explicit and differentiated 
theoretical attention (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.6-7). The causes for this include the 
super-globalisation of economic forces, communications and technology encouraging a 
more abundant exchange of ideas and values, and the presence of international 
organisations advocating knowledge-sharing (Evans and Davies 1999; Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000). Their framework for analyses addresses seven questions: Why do actors 
engage in policy transfer? Who are the key actors involved? What is transferred? From 
where are lessons drawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or 
facilitates the policy transfer process? And how is the process of policy transfer related to 
policy success or failure? (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.7). Dolowitz and Marsh’s 
definition of ‘success’ means, “…the extent to which policy transfer achieves the aims set 
by a government when they engaged in transfer, or is perceived as a success by the key 
actors involved in the policy area” which I apply to the Tcard case (Ibid, p.17). These 
questions are useful in investigating what Hong Kong did, that Sydney did not do, which 
may have led to the Tcard failure.  
 
Dolowitz and Marsh argue that policy transfer can be directly linked to the 
success or failure of a policy (Ibid). The three criteria assessing policy failure are 
uninformed transfer, incomplete transfer and inappropriate transfer (Ibid). Uninformed 
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transfer means that the transferee government had insufficient information about the 
policy; the goals, content, institutions, instruments, ideologies and programs involved 
(Ibid). Incomplete transfer happens when some parts of the policy have been transferred 
but other crucial elements were not. Inappropriate transfer is where the transferee country 
has not paid due attention to the major economic, social, political and ideological 
differences which may have allowed success in the transferor country, with its 
extraordinary circumstances (Ibid). However, the major weakness of Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s work is that the analytical framework can be ambiguous. Such weaknesses have 
been heavily criticized by James and Lodge who argue that the breadth and ambiguity of 
policy transfer literature is not distinguishable from other policy literature and that it is an 
“unpalatable cocktail of different types of beverage…‘policy transfer’ is less than the 
sum of its parts” (James and Lodge 2003, p.190). However I believe it holds firm ground 
in distinguishing itself by recognising that international transfer of policy is common 
practice that needs separate attention, as flawed transfer can change the fate of policies. 
Furthermore, idiosyncratic domestic factors are not independently responsible for success 
or failure (Ibid). Thus, this literature cannot be dismissed in the case of Sydney’s evident 
referral towards international best practice models on smartcards. 
 
Lastly, in the case at hand, there are no policy implementation studies regarding 
smartcards. The main journal relevant to smartcards is Card Technology Today but it 
only provides technical information on card technology and their socioeconomic impact. 
The main facts provided by these sources highlight the economic revenue of smartcards 
and potential security issues. London’s Oyster card, Warsaw’s City card, Hong Kong’s 
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Octopus card, Seoul’s T-Money card and Japan’s Suica card are all investigated in terms 
of their expanding utility beyond public transport to include restaurants, parking lots and 
retail stores (Lomax 2005; Najman 2009). Smartcards are seen to benefit users 
significantly as they offer faster transactions, shorter queues, fewer customer dropouts, 
less cash handling and reduced maintenance costs (Carter 2005). While these technology-
based journals provide the factual grounds in which the Tcard can be put into context, 
there is no academic coverage on the actual policy or political issues revolving around the 
implementation of such smartcards. These facts will be useful when comparing ERG’s 
delivery to Hong Kong and to Sydney in order to reveal whether Hong Kong had a pre-
packaged simpler, integrated fare system for successful ticketing reform, and if it had a 
streamlined transport operator to implement the smartcard project. 
 
The thesis I have proposed is an entirely novel one in the sense that I am 
experimenting with the marriage of two contemporary policy implementation 
frameworks that have not formerly been combined. In addition, the case study concerns 
the underexplored issue of smartcards. In doing so I attempt to advance and contribute to 
the current post-TD and BU debate amongst policy implementation scholars, by testing 
how effective Patashnik’s and, Dolowitz and Marsh’s work is in explaining failure. PDF 
and PTF stand as the most relevant policy frameworks on which I rely on seeking to 
explain the failure of the Tcard in Sydney despite the birth of a new organisation, 
enactment of law, millions of dollars worth of investment and the contracting of a vendor 
that has successfully delivered smartcards worldwide. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Need to Disassemble: New Wine in Old Wineskins will Burst 
 
2.1 Basic Anatomy of Patashnik’s Model  
 
Patashnik’s Disassembly Framework (PDF) is guided by three time periods of the 
policy process. The first is the pre-reform situation, which questions how the policy was 
formed and why it came upon the agenda. It encompasses the socioeconomic and 
political climate, key actors involved, tactics to neutralize opposition and the expectations 
at the time (Patashnik 2008, p.13).  This is important to the Tcard case because it 
illustrates the obstacles that were present, whether they were addressed and the 
motivations of the pro-reform coalition.  
 
The second time period examines the actual content of the reform in order to 
decipher what the legislation included or excluded, and whether the reform supported the 
goals of the Tcard policy (Ibid). This is key, as it seeks to reveal any flaws of the 
legislation itself that may have prevented the Tcard from being implemented smoothly; 
which actors had decision-making powers? Was power distributed to the right actors? 
Who was included and excluded? 
 
The third time period refers to the post-reform situation and is most crucial in 
helping diagnose what caused the failure of the Tcard policy as it includes a checklist of 
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three categories that may lead to policy implementation failure. The first is the existence 
of legacy political structures (Ibid, p.26). This criterion directly addresses questions of 
whether there was any change in the institutions in charge of the Tcard project; was there 
a streamlining of different operators? Was a new bureaucratic organisation born in place 
of old ones? Was the fare system reformed so that a Tcard could be introduced?  The 
second criterion asks whether pre-existing market rivals (Ibid, p.28) such as paper tickets 
were destroyed, which may be useful in analysing whether there was any market space 
for a Tcard. The third highlights negative policy feedback (Ibid, p.29); whether public 
transport users and other stakeholders involved in the policy process were satisfied with 
the Tcard or not.  
 
This framework essentially allows for close examination of the Tcard from 
conception to implementation. This model strongly facilitates the investigation of old 
structures that were incompatible with what was necessary for the new policy. It clearly 
suits the question of whether the legacy fare system and old bureaucratic structures stood 
in the way of implementing the Tcard. 
 
2.2 Pre-reform Situation: How did Tcard get on the Agenda? 
2.2A Sociopolitical and Economic Climate 
 
Politicians, public transport experts, lobby groups, transport operators and public 
transport users alike knew that Sydney, as a global city, was in dire need of a better 
public transport system. It was recognised post-2000 Olympics that congestion was an 
increasingly costly and environmentally unfriendly burden set to burgeon if public 
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transport was not upgraded (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808). In 1992, there 
was a Metropolitan Air Quality Study commissioned to help identify the sources and 
problems of air pollution in Sydney (Smith 1998, p.2). Concurrently, the NSW Health 
Department began a three year Health and Air Research Program which then led to the 
1995 and 1998 parliamentary research papers proposing better public transport initiatives 
(Ibid). There was also a Clean Air 2000 campaign run by the NRMA, focusing on 
identifying and mobilising deliverable transport solutions to the Sydney community. 
Other major papers such as the Action for Transport 2010, the NSW government’s 
cornerstone on transport policy was produced at the time (NSW Legislative Assembly 
1998, p.10712). This paper had broad goals of reducing environmental impacts and 
promoting integrated transport, including the need to integrate ticketing (Transport NSW 
2002, p.8). Public opinion surveys at the time also revealed that people thought better 
public transport was the best response to Sydney's growing congestion problem. The 
NRMA and Nielsen poll of November 2002 found that one of the public's leading 
priorities focused on the need to improve public transport (APT 2003, p.2).  
 
It was also becoming more apparent that Sydney was falling behind 
internationally. Pre-2000 was a time of global technological advancement and many 
cities were adopting the new smartcard technology; Hong Kong’s Octopus card, Japan’s 
Suica Cards, and Singapore’s EZ-Link were all designed and tested in the 1990s and 
rolled out in 1997, 2001 and 2002 respectively (Ang 2011; Ueno 2010). The idea of a 
smartcard was on the agenda for Sydneysiders since the mid 1990s corresponding to the 
international smartcard adoption trend, and the 2000 Sydney Olympics (NSW Legislative 
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Assembly 2006, p.20808). For Sydney, the active planning for the project started in 1997 
with an official endorsement of the Integrated Transport Plan, headed by the NSW Public 
Transport Authority, attempting to upgrade Integrated Ticketing and Integrated Transport 
Information Systems (Transport NSW 2002, p.8).  
 
The Tcard was seen as a simple and logical solution to advance and promote 
public transport. It was easy to use, fast, secure and would guarantee steps towards 
improving air quality and reducing congestion (NSW Department of Transport 2000, 
p.12). There was an expectation that all that was needed for the Tcard was a competent 
contractor to deliver the technology and an agency that overlooked the fairly simple 
implementation process (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p. 20808). Overall, the 
external climate was pro-public transport and pro-Tcard.  
 
 
In February 2003, the Department awarded ERG the contract to build the 
infrastructure necessary for the smartcard system (Ministry of Transport 2006, p.84). The 
smartcard was labeled ‘Tcard’, and the key body in charge of the project was the 
Transport Administration Corporation (TAC), which was the policy arm of the 
Department (Ministry of Transport 2004, p.34). 
 
The Tcard system was continuously developed and tested throughout 2005-06 but 
with a number of delays, a revised project schedule was negotiated (PTTC v ITSL and 
Anor (2009) NSWSC 54 sec.9b). It was expected that the Tcard would be implemented 
for the broader public on buses and rail in 2007 (Ministry of Transport 2006, p.6). In 
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2006, the Minister proposed an amendment to the Transport Administration Act 1988 
NSW to create a new agency, the Public Transport Ticketing Corporation (PTTC) to 
oversee the physical rollout of the Tcard, which was perceived to launch without 
difficulty (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808). The PTTC was seen as a 
necessary body to overlook the technical rollout of the Tcard, following the policy design 
already completed by TAC (PTTC v ITSL and Anor (2010) NSWSC 607 sec.24). Fare 
reform or changes in former transport operators were not introduced (Ibid).  
 
2.2B Key Actors: Yay or Nay  
 
Both Liberal and Labor parties were in favour of the Tcard as it had been a policy 
of both major parties over many years. Both also recognised the major potential for the 
Tcard to generate high economic revenue (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808).  
“The Opposition welcomes the introduction of the bill, if for no other reason 
than it finally starts to demonstrate some progress…this has been a 
longstanding promise by every transport Minister under the Carr and Iemma 
governments...The Opposition has no concerns with the concept of the Tcard, 
but we have many concerns with the Government's failure over 11 years to 
advance it significantly” (Ibid).  
 
However, it was made clear that “in conclusion, the Opposition does not oppose the 
bill. We look forward to, we hope, a significantly better performance on the part of the 
Government” (Ibid). The Christian Democratic Party also supported the legislation and 
the Australian Democratic Party highlighted that they too had advocated for such a bill 
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since 1996 (Ibid). The Greens also welcomed the bill, but criticised the lack of 
commitment the Labor party had towards the public.  
“We all want improved public transport and in no way do I wish to disparage 
the hard-working public servants who strive to make these things happen. But 
the Carr-Iemma Government has no credibility with this type of project. It has 
a sorry track record of disappointment. It is the political leadership of the 
State that is lacking” (Ibid) 
 
It is clear up to this point that while the concept of Tcard had no opposition, there 
was considerable opposition to the politicians running the project and a major sense of 
distrust. This echoes Patashnik’s underlying hypothesis that the responsibility for GIR 
implementation failure rests on the actions of elected officials and their relationship with 
citizenry rather than the bureaucracy. This is an important feature in the Tcard case as it 
illustrates that the politicians were the main decision makers and policy designers in the 
policy process and thus, were responsible for failure (Patashnik 2008, p.5). 
 
RailCorp, STA and Sydney Ferries were also supportive of the Tcard policy as 
they were part of the board that constructed the tender and contract for ERG. From 
20 February 2003 until 6 February 2007, TAC administered the contract with ERG 
through people seconded by RailCorp, STA and Sydney Ferries, Treasury and the 
Department (PTTC v ITSL and Anor (2010) NSWSC 607 sec.24). There was no evidence 
of bureaucratic feuds, but rather cooperation. However, it is unknown whether forming a 
singular transport operator was on the agenda at all in order for the Tcard to be better 
administered amongst the different transport operators rather than form the PTTC. It is 
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also unknown as to whether fares were mentioned and if they were, if operators agreed to 
leave legacy fares as they were.  
 
While it was assumed that the Rail, Tram and Bus Union (RTBU) in particular 
would be the key group reluctant to invite the Tcard with potential job cuts, this was not 
the case (Baker 2007). There were reports that bus drivers in the Kingsgrove depot 
denied further testing of the Tcard machines as the Automated Vehicle Location system 
(AVL) wasn’t working. There was also frustration towards STA as no end-date of trials 
was given (Ibid). However, RTBU publicly supported and cooperated with the Tcard 
trials as bus drivers continued to participate with AVL temporarily suspended (RTBU 
2007, p.7). Furthermore, RTBU explicitly stated in 2007 “…the RTBU has no problem 
with the T Card. We can clarify any confusion, for anyone who cares to hear” as they 
refuted media accusations for their opposition (Ibid). The executive director of the Bus 
and Coach Association (BCA), Darryl Mellish, also stated that with growing demand on 
public transport, there was a need for an integrated ticketing and fares system; "It's an 
excellent opportunity for the Government to make public transport a more attractive 
choice" (Baker 2006). 
 
Lobby groups such as Action for Public Transport (APT) also welcomed the 
Tcard, but were concerned with the necessary pre-implementation step of fare reform. 
APT were furious that real public consultations never took place particularly on fare 
prices. Issues included elimination of discounts such as TravelPass and not knowing how 
much was being charged per journey (Miles 2004). APT also remained skeptical over the 
  23 
vast number of tickets and fares scattered amongst the different transport operators. The 
Department’s list for private bus operators had 840 separate single fares, STA had 63 bus 
fares and additional to these were ferry fares, CityRail, monorail, light rail and other 
private ferries “…the total is truly frightening, and unnecessary” (APT 2003). The Tcard 
was perceived to be a great opportunity to simplify and reform fares and the APT was the 
only body that pointed this out. On the contrary, the politicians, PTTC and the Minister 
insisted on an efficient, revenue-raising smartcard technology to be delivered without 
changing legacy fares (Ibid).  
 
This raises questions of why the politicians didn’t mention or identify fare reform 
while it was such an important element of the Tcard project and why lobby groups such 
as APT were so alarmed by the absence of such discussion. Why were the politicians 
insisting on a legacy fare system and bureaucratic organisations, when the Tcard was 
essentially a completely newly integrated ticketing system in need of simplified fares? 
These questions will be addressed later in the thesis.  
 
2.2C Expectations of Key Actors 
 
The general expectations of the political parties, the general public and lobby 
groups such as APT highlighted that public transport users wanted an integrated, tech-
savvy ticketing system as soon as possible. Minor concerns over individual privacy of 
information and ERG’s financial stability did exist, however there was an overwhelming 
sense of urgency and support for the reform to take place (NSW Legislative Assembly 
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2006, p.20808). The Labor government itself was also eager to see the actualisation of 
the Tcard as reflected in its ambitions for making PTTC a commercial company with the 
government as its main shareholder. The government hoped that the Tcard would become 
an appealing multi-modal, multi-purpose card to flourish beyond transport services (Ibid).  
 
The APT raised the most important point that fare reform was a prerequisite to 
creating an integrated ticketing system. However, there was an absence of discussion 
regarding this issue by the Minister, Department and PTTC. This was also true amongst 
politicians, even with the passing of the Amendment Bill. The demand to streamline 
transport operators and de-clutter the legacy fare system was a major issue to be dealt 
with, and plenty of recommendations regarding fare reform had been given in the past. 
Warnings have been common throughout major public reports such as the Action for 
Public Transport 2010 (1998) as well as the Parry report (2003), which strongly advised 
for fare reform (Besser, 2007).  
 
It is clear that pre-existing legacy structures had not been cleaned up for the entry 
of the Tcard.  Old and complex fare systems were not reformed and the different 
transportation operators; STA, RailCorp and Sydney Ferries; had the same structure, 
powers and functions as beforehand. It was simply the case that the Amendment Bill to 
introduce the PTTC was tacked onto the already messy transportation system. This 
became a major structural and institutional malfunction which prevented the Tcard from 
being implemented. It limited the functions and decision-making powers of the PTTC as 
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powers were already distributed elsewhere, as will be demonstrated in the following 
section.  
 
2.3 Content of Reform Itself 
 
On 1 July 2006, the Transport Administration Amendment (PTTC) was passed, 
which established the PTTC to carry out the technical rollout of the Tcard (PTTC 2007, 
p.5). Its legislated objectives were to provide ticketing and fare payment services to 
public transport operators in NSW, promote and facilitate the integration of ticketing 
products and fare payment systems and be a successful business (PTTC 2007, p.3; NSW 
Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808). 
 
The PTTC was wholly subject to the control of the Minister’s directions and had 
no powers to make decisions on fare reform or take the roles of the existing transport 
operators (PTTC v ITSL and Anor (2010) NSWSC 607 sec.24). The Minister had the sole 
power to refer matters regarding fares over to the PTTC under section 35ZJ of the 
Transport Administration Amendment (PTTC) Bill: 
“The portfolio Minister may, by order in writing, direct that the assets, rights 
and liabilities of a transport authority, that relate to or are connected with the 
operation of a ticketing and fare payment system and that are specified or 
referred to in the order, be transferred to the PTTC.” (Transport Administration 
Amendment (PTTC) 2006).  
 
 
But it was not established as a policy body, but simply an organisation putting the 
nuts and bolts of the Tcard project together. TAC completed the policy design earlier 
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with the construction of the contract with ERG (PTTC v ITSL and Anor (2010) NSWSC 
607 sec.24). Following on from the somewhat illusory expectation that the Tcard would 
roll out smoothly and rapidly, the PTTC was to be constituted later as a State-Owned 
Corporation (SOC) meaning that its ultimate goal was to become a revenue-raising 
business for the Department (Transport Administration Amendment (PTTC) 2006). The 
Minister for roads, Eric Roozendaal, explicitly stated that PTTC was essentially a 
commercial cash-management business and that since the Tcard was expected to be fully 
operational within three to five years, it was not appropriate for the Ministry – a policy 
and regulatory agency, to take control (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808). With 
the number of transport operators participating, it was also deemed best that the 
establishment of PTTC would prevent any conflicts of interest (Ibid). 
 
The PTTC only consisted of eight members including the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) (Ibid). Following its inception, it boasted of its achievements in the 2006-07 
financial year which included the installation of Tcard equipment and software at STA’s 
Kingsgrove Depot, conducting an initial staff bus trial with Punchbowl Bus Company in 
Sydney’s Inner West and apparently, the completion of the software design, development 
and testing necessary to replicate the existing functionality of STA and RailCorp’s legacy 
ticketing system (PTTC 2007, p.4). It was expected that the Tcard rollout would be 
successful in the short term, and that PTTC would soon pursue commercial activities 
beyond public transport such as use of the Tcard at convenience stores or newsagents 
(NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808).  
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By this point, the evidence illustrates that there was no significant opposition to 
the Tcard; the general public, all major political parties, other commercial stakeholders as 
well as lobby groups and transport unions were supportive. Overall, there was a hopeful 
atmosphere for its successful rollout and the Amendment Bill was passed easily. The 
Labor government in power at the time of reform was so optimistic that the design of 
PTTC had long-term goals of becoming a commercial business for revenue and 
expansion to retail outlets following international best practice. However, frustration 
grew with the slow pace of implementation and there was a lack of explanation as to why 
there were so many delays when the right ‘implementation machine’ seemed to be in 
place. The point was that the foundational groundwork in which the Tcard reform was set 
upon was incompatible with the new system. Old rules, legacy fare structures and the 
still-segregated transport operators with the same functions severely limited the powers 
of the PTTC. Its attempt at implementing the Tcard was an impossible task due to the 
pre-existing structural and institutional arrangements.  
 
2.4 Post-reform Situation: Devolution of Reform 
2.4A Prelude: Devolution Timeline 
 
By 2007, the transport call centre 131 500 was trained to manage queries about 
the Tcard Punchbowl Bus Field Trial, and basic installation of poles and mounting 
brackets for Tcard readers were provided in 160 stations (PTTC 2007, p.4). However, 
PTTC had very little information on when exactly the Tcard would come to life and 86 
per cent of the PTTC’s annual reports were wholly devoted to financial statements and 
appendices.  
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The 2008 report was an embarrassment for PTTC and a major disappointment for 
the public who had already waited almost a decade for what was seemingly a make-
believe Tcard. PTTC terminated its contract with ERG due to its failure to meet 
milestones and the two parties are now in the NSW Supreme Court attempting to gain 
compensation for the losses incurred by the termination of the contract (PTTC v ITSL and 
Anor (2010) NSWSC 607). However, even when the contract was terminated on 23 
January 2008, the NSW Government remained committed to introducing a smartcard. It 
established an interagency Steering Group comprised of officers from PTTC, Department 
of Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and an independent advisor to direct future steps 
(PTTC 2008, p.2). 
 
Another Expression Of Interest (EOI) to contract a new company to deliver the 
next smartcard. The Department mentioned Tcard just once in its annual report in 2008, 
hidden in the appendices and finally recognised the need for fare integration and review 
(Ministry of Transport 2008, p.35). On 7 May 2010, the PTTC signed a new contract 
with Pearl Consortium, a subsidiary of Cubic Transportation Systems. Sydneysiders were 
promised a system comparable to London’s Oyster card (PTTC 2010, p.2). The PTTC 
Board was dissolved on 1 July 2010, and its activities were put back under the 
Department’s Transport Coordination Division, which actually had decision-making 
powers (Ibid). Today we face a Tcard déjà vu, reminiscent of 2003 when TAC was 
responsible for the Tcard policy design.  
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The following three elements are crucial in diagnosing what went wrong in the 
post-reform situation. According to Patashnik, if this checklist is addressed, reforms will 
last. I will test these three criteria; pre-existing political structures, market rivals and 
policy feedback to tease out what led to the failure of the Tcard policy, and if the 
existence of the former fare structures and segregated bureaucratic structures were a 
significant causal factor leading to failure.  
 
2.4B Political Structures 
 
Patashnik argues that in tandem with an introduction of a new policy and 
enactment, reform has better chances of ‘sticking’ if the structural environment also 
changes (Patashnik 2008, p.26). The different shifts that are recommended include firstly, 
the strengthening of governing authorities. This uncovers whether the pro-Tcard coalition 
were provided with an optimal environment in which they could exercise authority easily 
and effectively, if new staff were hired for their advantage and whether ‘red tape’ was 
eliminated to increase their administrative discretion. The second shift required is the 
destruction or extracting of power from former ‘cozy policy systems’ or ‘iron triangles’ 
to prevent inefficient modes of governance and empower post-reform systems of 
governance. Third, raising or lowering political transaction costs to increase stickiness 
and confidence for key actors, convincing actors that there is positive headway along the 
reform route and deterring anyone from doing anything in contradiction of the reform 
route (Ibid, 27).  
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2.4B(i) Have the Governing Authorities been Strengthened?  
 
As mentioned beforehand, PTTC was designed to be a commercial business, not 
of policy or regulatory nature. The Minister created this agency intentionally to separate 
it from being accessed easily by transport operators “deemed best that the ticketing 
agency had no conflicts of interest in its dealings” (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, 
p.21050). The PTTC was strengthened in the sense that a very narrow board of eight high 
level staff were hired to submit directly and solely to the Minister’s orders (Ibid). This 
was an important tactic that prevented opposition from intervening in the Tcard project. 
The public, the contractor, other political parties had no avenue to access the PTTC nor 
was it the right place to go for dialogue. The individual Minister, the key decision maker 
in the Tcard project whom PTTC submitted to, was very difficult to access. 
 
The major flaw of the PTTC was that although it was an isolated arena where 
policy-related changes could not be made and was at the private access of the Minister, in 
practice it was not a governing authority. The PTTC only submitted to the Minister’s 
orders and was not able to make its own. It was beyond the jurisdiction of the PTTC to 
reform fares or discuss the project with any other actors in general. The Minister 
possessed supreme power to change directions but chose not to as referred to beforehand 
in Section 35ZJ of the Amendment Bill. It is clear that the bureaucrats did not have the 
ability to revolt against the policy and there was no conflict between the Minister’s orders 
and street-level bureaucrats failing to perform. Rather, there was a gap between the 
politicians and the citizenry as the Minister himself was not delivering his promise to the 
public and had insisted on a legacy fare structure which was overtly complex for 
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smartcard technology to embrace (Independent Public Inquiry, p.273). At this point, the 
analysis using PDF allows for the identification of who was responsible for the failure of 
the Tcard and further directs the need to investigate what exactly, they did wrong.  
 
2.4B(ii) Has there been a Demolition of Iron Triangles?  
 
Traditionally, an iron triangle was defined as a closed and stable relationship 
between interest groups, a government agency and US congressional committee (Jordan 
and Schubert 1992, p.21). However, in its application here, the broad idea of the iron 
triangle is applied – referring to a limited number of privileged groups who are 
likeminded in their goals and participate in mutually supportive activities, thus engaging 
in active partnership to steer the policy-making process (Ibid). The pre-existing structure 
constituted matters regarding ticketing to be in the autonomous jurisdictions of the 
separate transport operators. STA, RailCorp and Sydney Ferries and various other private 
transport operators all made decisions of pricing their own fares, whether it be distance-
based, zone-based or a mix of the two (Transport Administration 1988 NSW, Sec. 85).  
 
There was no anti-Tcard iron triangle in place as the politicians in power and the 
different transport operators were all in favour of a Tcard. However, it is clear that a new 
iron triangle had been formed between the Minister with or without his pro-Tcard heads 
of the different transport operators, the PTTC and ERG. The public, lobby groups, other 
politicians, consultancies, transport policy researchers and experts were excluded from 
the conversation about the construction, design and rollout of the Tcard (Miles 2006). 
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According to PDF though, this exclusivity is supposed to be a good thing, assisting in the 
‘stickiness’ of reforms as pro-reform groups are given special privileges, enjoy limited 
access to decision-making venues and administrative process are fast-tracked (Patashnik 
2008, p.26-8). However, in the Tcard case the intentions and actions of the actors in the 
new iron triangle can be perceived as wholly flawed as crucial elements required for the 
physical implementation of the Tcard were missing. This brings about considerable 
damage to the legitimacy of this iron triangle and also accounts for the near loss of hope 
for the Tcard project due to the failure to reform fares and bureaucratic structures. The 
new iron triangle was simply dysfunctional as the PTTC was not given policy-altering 
powers, there was no integrative cooperation amongst transport operators and the 
Minister had decided not to reform the fares. 
 
2.4B(iii) Did High Political Transaction Costs Deter Actors from Contesting the 
Reform Path?  
 
The Amendment Bill gave supreme power to the Minister, thus made it 
impossible for anyone to do the ‘wrong thing’– that is, to oppose or disrupt the Tcard 
project. The PTTC’s board of directors were appointed by the Minister himself; 
submitted solely to the Minister; were sheltered from extra staff, other politicians, 
bureaus, media or the general public. This type of exclusive political venue was optimal 
for fast, uninterrupted implementation of the Tcard. The majority of the eight directors 
were former transport chief executives or directors. Members’ profiles included Vince 
Graham, the former CEO of RailCorp, Helen Willoughby former manager of 
communications at RailCorp, John Lee former CEO of STA NSW and managing director 
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of Westbus, Jim Glasson Director-General of the Department who resigned, John Stott 
former CEO of STA who also resigned and Kim McGrath, lawyer and financier who also 
resigned from appointment at the PTTC (PTTC 2008, p.4-5).  
 
Three of seven board members resigned from appointment at the PTTC before its 
first annual report was published in 2007 (PTTC 2007, p.4-5). News articles on directors 
leaving a weak project became increasingly noticeable. An insider commented on John 
Stott’s resignation as ‘leaving a sinking ship’ and stakeholders were skeptical over his 
replacement, Elizabeth Zealand, who had no transport experience with former experience 
at the Department of Commerce (Baker 2007). This high rate of resignation within the 
PTTC undermines the strength of the governing authorities.  This reflects a loss of faith 
in the feasibility of the Tcard project by the newly formed triangle and signifies just one 
aspect of the breakdown of the new institutional structure being built on top of an already 
old, dysfunctional structure of segregated transport operators with complex autonomous 
fare systems. Although the reform coalitions enjoyed privileged access to the PTTC, 
there was little value in this as the foundations of the project were defective and members 
of the pro-reform coalition itself were losing confidence in the Tcard project. These signs 
accrue to show that something was not quite right with the Tcard. Faith weakened 
because it was simply not working.  
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2.4C Creative Destruction: Breaking the Existing Order 
 
So far, PDF has helped diagnose problems associated with the pre-existing 
political structures. This second section continues this emphasis on the need to 
disassemble old structures but focuses on the market structures that need to be addressed. 
This involves looking at whether any other competing marketing rivals to the Tcard were 
present and if consumer choices affected the rollout of the Tcard.  
 
2.4C(i) Investment in the Development of New Policy Ideas and Destruction of 
Alternative or Opposing Policies  
 The Minister and his Department generated the impression that Tcard would 
soon be the new and only way of ticketing and soon, there would be no other way of 
travelling (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808). However, STA had archaic 
ticketing machines, designed by ERG in 1993 that often broke down (Besser 2008). STA 
were ordered to wait for the ‘coming soon’-Tcard before wasting money on buying new 
paper magnetic ticket machines. Waiting patiently for the Tcard rollout and abiding by its 
rules was the ‘right thing to do’ and the STA invested in that idea by making the decision 
to not invest in alternative infrastructure. However, because the Tcard never came about, 
the old ticket machines were in such dire condition that the NSW Department had to 
negotiate with the Queensland government (who have recently adopted their own 
Translink smartcard) to buy 300 of Brisbane's equivalently archaic 15 year-old ticketing 
machinery to lessen the breakdowns Sydney’s public transport users had to face (Ibid).  
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Although the market was ready for the Tcard, the legacy transportation system it 
was layered on top of was brittle, with 18,328 ticket machine faults and breakdowns 
between January 2008 and October 2009 (Ibid), and poor transport infrastructure 
planning in general. 
 
APT also expressed its loss of trust and confidence in the Tcard project and 
shifted towards an attitude of giving up. APT became increasingly pessimistic and 
criticised tag-on and tag-off and the concept of distance-based fares as a major burden on 
travelers (APT 2007). There was also concerns over having insufficient travel funds 
without knowing and forgetting to tag-off on journeys which would result in wasting 
commuters’ money.  
 
The Sydney Morning Herald accused the Minister of not reforming the fares 
because of the fear that reforming fare prices would negatively affect voting (Sexton 
2011). ERG went further to claim that the nature of the project was directly intertwined 
with politicians getting elected so much so, that the contract was terminated “to enhance 
the prospects of re-election of Labor government at the 2011 NSW general election, 
rather than for any reason connected with the performance of the contract” (Ibid). APT 
stated that the project was a mess, with the legacy fare structure as a: 
“Serious headache for which no-one had a remedy... a simplified fare system 
would mean winners and losers amongst passengers, and no politician wanted 
losers in his or her electorate. And Treasury wanted none of it, because it 
would have implications for revenue…the basic concept of a smartcard is 
good…however, Sydney's Tcard had no high level supremo or champion to 
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fight for it, to knock heads together, or to clear a path through the jungle.”(APT 
2009)  
 
While PDF does not intentionally analyse the motivations of key actors adopting 
GIR, the analysis of other actors offers evidence that fares and bureaucratic structures had 
not been reformed due to politicians’ preoccupations on sustaining votes in the next 
election.  
 
In the past, the Department had been told repeatedly to reform its complex, 
inefficient and confusing fare system. A 2007 report by Ernst & Young recommended 
instituting a distance-based fare that would be charged for every leg of a commuter's 
journey (Besser 2007). This echoed the 2003 Parry report by the Government's top 
pricing adviser, Professor Tom Parry, who also strongly urged for fare reform (Parry 
2003, p.59-62). However, neither the Minister at the time (John Watkins), PTTC CEO  
Elizabeth Zealand nor ERG's executive director Steve Gallagher commented on 
reforming legacy fares (Besser 2007).  
 
APT concluded that with a simpler fare structure, we might be using the Tcard by 
now (APT 2009). According to the EOI paper released by the Department, the objectives 
of the electronic ticketing system were: 
a) Providing a system that is convenient, easy to use and reliable 
b) Supporting the NSW Government’s preferred fare structure and cost recovery 
policy  
c) Improving coordination, both within and across modes of public transport. 
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Objective b) should set alarm bells ringing (Ibid). The Tcard policy was a new 
one, yet the legacy fare structure was an old foundation. A non-integrated fare system and 
an integrated ticketing system were completely incompatible, which was both a technical 
and political problem. Technical in terms of the amount of different fare products and the 
absence of software to cater to it, but inherently political as the Minister and his policy 
designing team decided not to reform the fares.  
 
PDF has helped bring to surface the problems with the older structures and 
identifying politicians as the key actors responsible for the success or failure of the Tcard 
implementation. However, what Patashnik does not address is the deeper motivations of 
the key decision makers. Why did the politicians insist on the pre-existing fare system? 
Why didn’t they want to reform the fares? The framework has indirectly provided some 
evidence on the reasons through the arguments put forward by various other actors. APT 
Chairman Allan Miles as well as ERG accused politicians of ignoring the fare problem 
due to their fear of losing votes. While the question of why politicians are so centered on 
elections and underperform in governance is beyond the original scope of this thesis, this 
issue of excluding fares and bureaucratic reform will be further discussed towards the end 
of this paper.  
  
2.4C(ii) Market Forces: Post-reform Market Share and Consumer Choices 
 
The only other existing form of tickets was the magnetic strip paper ticket, also 
provided by ERG since the 1980s (then called AES Prodatam) (Australian Transport 
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Discussion Board 2008). Because the company is the same, there was no rival provider of 
tickets, thus this aspect of market forces being a factor that points to the success or failure 
of the Tcard is not applicable; more so because the Tcard machine was never formally 
rolled out. Hence, the choices of ‘millions of consumers’ cannot be tested here (Patashnik 
2008, p.28).  
 
However, due to the continually extended delays of the Tcard, an ad hoc creation 
of MyZone tickets was rolled out on 18 April 2010 which in actual fact, was a misleading 
brand name because it was not a fare system based on zones (Independent Public Inquiry 
2010, p.261). Fare penalties associated with interchanging between services actually 
worsened (Ibid). While there was a change in reducing long-distance rail fares and 
increasing shorter distance bus fares and ferry fares, there was no fundamental change to 
the fare structure, thus it was not ‘integrated’ in terms of either ticketing or fares (Ibid, 
p.262). This system would cost the government AU$33 million a year in lost revenue, 
and it was expected that increased patronage would hopefully substitute for those losses 
(Cranston 2010). This was no rival to the Tcard, but rather an emergency quick fix. 
 
2.4D Policy Feedback 
 
This final section on Tcard post-reform assesses whether new policies had indeed 
created new politics – that is, has the policy reshaped identities, interests and goals of 
individuals and groups? Have political resources been allocated efficiently? Has the 
political dynamic transformed to a point where reversing course on this reform became 
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extremely unattractive or almost impossible? These questions help reveal whether enough 
had been done to sustain the Tcard reform and highlight what had been missing.  
2.4D(i) Has the Policy Retained its Supporters – Allocating Political Resources and 
Discouraging Political Mobilisation?  
 
Because the rollout of the Tcard was so delayed, the politicians, coalition 
members themselves and the public lost trust in the promise. The opposing (Liberal) 
party was in favour of the Tcard at the start but doubted the feasibility of the project 
towards its later stages. In November 2007 when the Tcard contract with ERG was 
terminated, the Legislative Assembly did not take the issue lightly as Liberal MP Barry 
O'Farrell sharply questioned the Minister,  
“How does he justify his dumb decision to allow the Tcard project to drag on at 
a cost of least $65 million to taxpayers when four years ago his Treasurer 
warned it was a "dumb process"? Why can he not deliver what has been 
achieved in Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth?” (NSW Legislative Assembly 
2007, p. 3919) 
 
Opposition transport spokeswoman Ms. Gladys Berejiklian further argued, 
"Commuters and taxpayers shouldn't have to take John Watkins' 'trust me' statements 
when he's personally promised to deliver Tcard for three years and has failed" (ABC 
2007). Meanwhile, the public was concerned that with the contract terminated, it would 
take another decade before the next smartcard. Transport operators were also left in the 
dark throughout the entire implementation process, without being told how much the 
deposit for the Tcard infrastructure would be, or how fares would be calculated (Baker 
2007). 
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On 29 November 2007, the Opposition proposed a motion in parliament that all 
documents from 2003 onwards relating to the Tcard project be made available for 
parliament, including “any variations of the contracts, all notes, briefs … any disputes in 
the possession or control of the Department, Office of the Minister, RailCorp, State 
Transit Authority, Sydney Ferries and the Public Transport Ticketing Corporation” 
(NSW Legislative Assembly 2007, p.3919). This illustrates the inability of the key 
decision makers of the pro-reform coalition to win over and reshape identities and 
interests to concur with theirs. This was also true in the early stages of the reform as other 
MPs stated their support for the concept of the Tcard, but not of the party in charge of 
delivering it. The Minister failed to neutralise opposition to the policy in the later stages. 
The honesty, accountability and entire function of the Minister, his Department and the 
PTTC were put under internal scrutiny (Ibid).  
 
Overall, faith was lost from the public due to continued delays and it was 
perceived as just another broken promise. Confidence also waned within the PTTC as 
milestones were not being achieved, to the frustration of both board directors and ERG 
staff, as illustrated by the string of PTTC board member resignations (PTTC 2007, p.4-5). 
Finally, there was the crucial fallout between the contractor ERG and the PTTC and 
Department on 13 February 2009 as the two parties pursued litigation in the Supreme 
Court regarding lost finances caused by the failed project (PTTC v ITSL and Anor (2009) 
NSWSC S54).  
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2.4D(ii) Has the Policy Created Expectations among Individuals and Groups that 
make it Difficult or Unattractive for Leaders to Reverse Course? 
 
What is interesting about this Tcard policy is that even after a waiting period of 
more than a decade and having had to witness taxpayers’ money being wasted as well as 
the PTTC and ERG battle in court, people still want a smartcard. The politicians, lobby 
groups and public were angry with the promisors of the Tcard and their failure to deliver, 
but not the concept of a smartcard itself. A 550-page zealous independent public inquiry 
devoting a major chapter on fare reform and repeatedly demanding the need for an 
integrated fare and ticketing system indicates such attitudes (Sydney Morning Herald 
Independent Public Inquiry 2010, p.59). Here, the Tcard policy splits into two 
dimensions. On one hand, the public is dissatisfied with the politicians responsible for the 
design and delivery of the Tcard and other key actors are keen to reverse and undo this 
aspect of the Tcard project. Hence a new appointment of actors to deliver the Tcard is 
seen as necessary. On the other hand, the concept of smartcard technology is still desired 
on all fronts and it is highly unlikely that this option would be withdrawn entirely.  
 
In this sense, the promises and expectations that the policy had generated have 
really ‘stuck’ over time. It was also clear for Sydneysiders that they were not asking for 
the impossible as all witnessed Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth (NSW Legislative 
Assembly 2007, p.3919) adopting smartcard technology, let alone what has already 
become the international norm for OECD countries in the last two decades (Edwards and 
Smith 2008, p.2-4). Thus it was extremely unattractive for any politician from any party 
to scrap the idea of a smartcard.  
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Table 2.1 has been devised by Patashnik to illustrate the different categories of 
post-reform policy outcomes. From the analysis I have conducted on the Tcard, it is 
ironic to conclude that the Tcard policy inclusive of the Amendment Bill and 
establishment of the PTTC is in the ‘Entrenchment of Reform’ box. The policy had come 
too far, was too publicised, and as highlighted beforehand, had been the desirable policy 
of multiple parties over time. As mentioned in the start of the paper, the nature of the 
Tcard reform was a General Interest Reform, which was desired by the vast majority of 
people. Despite the PTTC board being dissolved and thus the Amendment Bill becoming 
void with its activities handed back under the Transport Coordination Division (TCD) in 
June 2009 (PTTC 2010, p.2), the policy for a smartcard was ‘dug in’. There was 
extensive investment in terms of time, money and political energy into the Tcard and the 
idea of having a smartcard policy reversal is highly unlikely. This is evident with the 
announcement of the new contractor Cubic to deliver another new smartcard system 
(Aston 2011).  
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Table 2.1 Policy Feedback and Post-Reform Dynamics 
 
Group Investments 
 
Group Identities and Affiliations 
 
 Stable 
Identities and group affiliations 
remain stable, many clienteles 
have common policy preferences 
 
Fluid 
New groups emerge, coalitional 
alignments undergo rapid change, 
interest group cohesion is low 
 
Modest 
Social actors fail to 
make large scale 
investments; 
organisational 
adaptations to the reform 
are minimal 
 
 
 
REVERSAL OF REFORM 
 
“The Empire Strikes Back” 
 
“Never Mind” 
 
 
 
EROSION OF REFORM 
 
“Death By A Thousand Cuts” 
 
“Smothering” 
 
Extensive 
Groups make large 
scale, often highly 
specific investments 
based on the expectation 
that the reform will 
continue 
 
 
 
 
ENTRENCHMENT OF 
REFORM 
 
“Dug In” 
 
 
 
RECONFIGURATION 
 
“Whole New Ball Game” 
(Source: Patashnik 2008, p. 32) 
 
So how has the Tcard survived all this time? Why don’t the key actors and public 
transport users in general just give up on the policy altogether? By using Table 2.1, it can 
be understood that due to large-scale, highly specific investments based on the 
expectation that the Tcard reform will continue, the idea of the Tcard has stuck over time. 
The last 13 years, millions of dollars worth of taxpayers’ money, the Amendment Bill in 
2006 and the establishment of the PTTC did make a mark. The Tcard is dug in but 
completely static as identities and group affiliations; of the former STA, RailCorp and 
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Sydney Ferries all remain the same as well as their segregated fare structures. The reform 
is now an issue actors must deal with and will haunt politicians for some time. 
 
Additionally I point to the value and expectation built on the Tcard via the media 
that has contributed to labelling the Tcard as an unforgettable failure, and without 
closure. The long but negative history of the Tcard project has been an infamous one that 
has displayed high transparency (although unwanted and unintended) to the public eye by 
a range of newspapers, especially the Sydney Morning Herald. Hopes were raised, and 
when it failed, made the disappointment all the more heavy. The public, since the 
government failed to deliver the promise of the Tcard, now feel as though they deserve it, 
as it is rightfully entitled to them.  As the opposition party highlighted, the Minister and 
his Department owed the taxpayers millions of dollars in the failure. Again, this 
highlights the commitment gap between the politicians and the citizenry that Patashnik 
emphasized with the nature of GIRs, reminding citizens of the core purposes of 
politicians – the people who are supposed to be representing the opinions and values of 
the general public and making sound decisions on citizens’ behalf. 
 
Conclusion: What PDF has Uncovered  
Patashnik’s model has helped illustrate the major causes of the Tcard failure; the 
remaining legacy bureaucratic structures and their non-integrated, complex fare systems. 
Through mapping out the pre-reform situation, the details of the old structures were laid 
out. The framework helped identify who the responsible key actors were, and in the 
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examination of the content of reform, also highlighted that pre-existing power 
distributions remained unchanged and the PTTC was essentially stripped of any 
authoritative powers. The post-reform section assessed whether that old structure 
underwent sufficient reconfiguration to embrace a new system. It was clear that even with 
high investment, little opposition, and no market rival, the old structures and the 
allocations of power simply were not compatible with the new structures that were 
necessary for the Tcard implementation.  
 
However, Patashnik is limited to a domestic case analysis and it is still a puzzle as 
to how so many other cities successfully adopted the smartcard. Did they have simple 
fares and streamlined bureaucracies? What allowed smartcards to be successful 
elsewhere? Was there something else Sydney was missing? Dolowitz and Marsh’s Policy 
Transfer Framework (PTF) allows for a comprehensive analysis of what Sydney didn’t 
do, and what Hong Kong did, to have a smooth, successful implementation of a 
smartcard. HK’s Octopus smartcard was the benchmark model Sydney set itself to copy 
and both cities contracted the same company, ERG to deliver it. PTF confirms that the 
failure to reform fares is inextricably linked to the failure to establish a single transport 
operator which both lead to the Tcard implementation failure. PTF also delves deeper 
into the motivational aspect of key actors and how this could affect the outcome of a 
policy.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Policy Transfer: Why Sydney Couldn’t Clone Hong Kong’s Octopus Card 
 
3.1 Dolowitz and Marsh’s Policy Transfer Framework  
 
PTF addresses the international nature of smartcard policies and helps 
demonstrate how Sydney had explicitly attempted policy transfer from HK’s success case 
but failed. It answers the question of how it worked elsewhere but not here and allows for 
further investigation on what exactly HK did, that Sydney missed to ensure the successful 
implementation of the Tcard. On the surface, Sydney seemed to have transferred the main 
ingredients necessary for successful policy transfer, by contracting the same company 
ERG as well as establishing a separate new organisation, the PTTC, to deliver it. PTF 
confirms that the main factors that led to the Tcard failure were the absence of a 
streamlined transport authority and its possession of actual powers to make decisions 
over fares. The PTF is composed of a sequence of seven questions which will be explored 
in this chapter1.  
 
 
 
                                                
1 NB: The original sequence of questions is: 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.9). The 
sequence has been altered to better suit this case study. 
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3.2 Why do Actors Engage in Policy Transfer? 
 
This question addresses the motivations of the key actors initiating reform by 
analysing whether reform was adopted due to coercive and/or voluntary factors. This is 
important as it examines whether different motives result in different policy designs, and 
their implications.  
 
Actors engage in policy transfer when a problem arises and there is dissatisfaction 
with the internal solutions available; whether it’s because they haven’t worked before, or 
because the same problem was addressed better elsewhere (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 
p.346-9). Supporters of the dissatisfaction model presume that when governmental 
policies are functioning properly there is no need to search for lessons, but when these 
established routines stop providing ‘solutions’ it is necessary to start searching (Ibid). 
Dolowitz and Marsh state that policy actors engage in policy transfer because they 
volunteer, are coerced to do so, or it is a mixture of both (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.9). 
For the Tcard, it was mainly voluntary, but driven by perceived necessity.  
Figure03.1 From Lesson-drawing to Coercive Transfer 
 
 
 
(Source: Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.13) 
     
     
Coercive Transfer 
(direct imposition) 
Lesson-Drawing 
(perfect rationality) 
Lesson-drawing 
(bounded rationality) 
Voluntary but driven 
by perceived 
necessity 
Conditionality Obligated Transfer 
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3.2A Voluntary, but Driven by Perceived Necessity 
	  
3.2A(i) Local Socioeconomic and Political Demands 
 
This section is covered in detail in the previous chapter’s section on pre-reform. 
To recap, there was high support for the Tcard policy. The status quo of having cars carry 
around 78 per cent of the weekday passengers in Sydney was unsustainable with 
congestion and greenhouse gas emissions (Glazebrook 2009, p.7). At the same time, with 
increasing population density the demand for public transport had been growing by 12.4 
per cent per year from 1996-2006 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008). Furthermore, 
the Tcard was perceived as a good financial investment as the PTTC was seen as a 
potential revenue-raising business in future (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808). 
As outlined in the previous chapter, for reasons of economic revenue and convenience, 
the idea of a multi-purpose contactless card expanding to retail outlets was an appealing 
one (Ibid). The Tcard was seen as a perceived necessity to upgrade public transport and 
make it more attractive (Ibid).  
 
3.2A(ii) International Lesson Drawing and Benchmarking 
 
Sydney desires to be a competitive global city, especially in relation to its Asian 
neighbours. Sydney has compared itself to HK, along with a few other cities as the major 
benchmarks to follow. Tom Edwards and Stewart Smith’s briefing for Parliament titled 
Transport Problems Facing Large Cities emphasized that all major cities were facing 
congestion problems, rising oil prices and the imperative to reduce carbon emissions but 
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Sydney had to remain competitive domestically and internationally, to attract business 
(Edwards and Smith 2008, p.1-2). Hence, an advanced transportation system was 
necessary. In 2005, the Global and World Cities research group ranked Sydney as an 
Alpha world city, the third tier below Alpha++ (London, New York) and Alpha+ cities 
(Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, Singapore), in terms of the provision and connectedness of a 
city’s advanced consumer services (NSW Government 2010, p.46). The Global City 
Power Index issued by Japan’s Mori Memorial Foundation also evaluated 35 of the 
world’s major cities with a more comprehensive ranking system, based on economy, 
research and development, cultural interaction, livability, natural environment and 
accessibility. Sydney ranked 14th overall, and within the Asia-Pacific region; fifth behind 
Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong and Seoul (Infrastructure Australia 2010, p.13-5). 
However, it ranked most poorly on the Accessibility score, namely referring to 
transportation infrastructure (Ibid).  
 
Sydney also fell from fifth to eighth place in the 2004-05 annual Mercer Quality 
of Life survey (Ibid). Mercer, a global management remuneration expert group evaluated 
criteria such as political, economic, social and environmental factors, including transport 
(Ibid). As demonstrated in figure 3.2, Sydney's fall in the various international rankings 
was essentially due to its poor transport infrastructure. MP Clover Moore stated that 
Sydney could not leave its archaic transport system as it was, for both domestic and 
international priorities. If reform did not take place, Sydney would not be able to remain 
“…globally competitive, which will have detrimental flow-on effects for the national 
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economy” and would not be able to stand up to its Asian neighbours (NSW Legislative 
Assembly 2006, p.20808). 
 
Figure03.2 Function-specific Ranking of Sydney, Deviation from Global Medians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Infrastructure Australia 2010, p. 14) 
3.3 From Where are the Lessons Drawn? 
 
This question identifies where the policy has been transferred from; either within 
or outside a nation and the reasons why that particular country, city or local area had been 
chosen. This question further builds on the first, by highlighting why key actors chose 
Hong Kong as the benchmark example, and whether this was appropriate.  
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Lessons concerning smartcards have been drawn from many different global cities 
such as New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, Singapore and Hong Kong, just to name a few 
(Smith 2008, p.1-4). In this paper, Hong Kong’s (HK) Octopus card will be used as a 
parallel case study as it was the specific model explicitly mentioned by government 
reports, politicians and media in reference to the development of the Tcard since the late 
1990s until the termination of the contract with ERG in 2008.  
 
HK’s development of the Octopus card was specifically targeted as an end-
product model for the Tcard as it was one of the earliest adoptions of smartcard 
technology in 1997 (Li, 2008, p. 2). In context of the 2000 Olympics, the issue of 
integrated transport in Sydney was a major pending question. NSW Legislative Council 
papers demonstrated that HK’s Octopus card was a well-known, prime example for 
Sydney. Within the Legislative Council MP Elaine B. Nile questioned why such complex 
ticketing existed in Sydney and why tourists and residents alike could not easily purchase 
a universal pass. She further demanded that the government “consider implementation of 
a universal economical cash-free electronic travel pass covering travel on light rail, 
monorail, train, bus and ferry services in Sydney similar to that used in Hong Kong” 
(NSW Legislative Council 1997, p.54). The response was that the government had 
already set up the Public Transport Authority (PTA) in the 1996 transport reforms, 
calling for an EOI to develop a fully integrated ticketing system for both Government and 
privately operated public passenger services in the Sydney metropolitan area (Ibid).  
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, development of the Tcard policy was slow 
and the contract with ERG was signed in 2003 (Ministry of Transport 2004, p.83). 
Discourse over HK’s Octopus card continued at this time as elected officials and public 
inquiries alike advocated the benefits of such a smartcard. The International Association 
of Public Transport (UITP) drove the key message that Australia needed a ‘seamless 
journey’ to be attractive and deter private car use (UITP 2003, p.11-2). An inquiry 
submitted by Professor Peter Newman, Director at the Institute for Sustainability and 
Technology Policy, suggested prior to the reform that long-term thinking and policy 
visions concerning transport infrastructure was essential for Sydney to change its 
character in terms of ecological footprint (Newman, 2006, p.2). Overall, there was a 
predominant emphasis on the rise of Asian cities and Australia’s need to compete. MP 
Steven Chaytor in his inaugural speech stated: 
“I look forward to Sydney taking its place as a world city in the Asia-Pacific 
region…few issues would assist that better functioning than an integrated smart 
card for all transport and daily item purchases in Sydney. To become a leading 
world city, Sydney must adopt world's best practice...the Hong Kong Octopus 
card is Australian technology by an Australian company. I could not think of a 
better place to use it than here” (NSW Legislative Assembly 2005, p.18506) 
 
 
MP Clover Moore further identified in the Legislative Council that Australia was 
very behind compared to Asian cities and HK provided many lessons to learn: 
“…the MTR Corporation achieves better than 99 per cent timetable accuracy 
and passengers complain about delays of more than 10 seconds. Imagine what 
Hong Kong commuters would think of our trains!” (NSW Legislative 
Assembly 2006, p.20808) 
 
 
  53 
From the late 1990s until the enactment of the Amendment Bill in 2006, there was 
a sense of insistence on catching up to the Asian neighbours and to not fall so far behind. 
  
3.4 Who are the Key Actors Involved in the Policy Transfer Process? 
 
This question identifies the different stakeholders or influences involved in the 
policy process; politicians, bureaucrats, institutions, ideologies, attitudes and cultural 
values, consultants, think tanks, transnational corporations and supranational institutions 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.9). This helps recognise who was responsible for the Tcard 
failure, again their motives and the degree to which transfer occurred.  
 
The authors point out that depending on who the key actors are, their motives 
differ – thus, the degree to which transfer occurs and to what extent the country can 
choose to engage in the process, and reasons for failure can be discovered (Ibid, p.8). In 
the Sydney case, while there were academic institutions, lobby groups and public 
servants who had an opinion on the Tcard, the design and development of the Tcard as an 
imitation of HK’s Octopus card was profoundly in the hands of the Minister and his pro-
reform coalition.  
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the key decision maker in the Tcard project 
was the Minister (Michael Costa), who from 2003-2008 was a member of the Labor Party 
(Parliament of NSW 2009). Much of what the Labor Party and the Minister desired from 
the Tcard was made clear throughout the statements made in NSW Parliament in the 
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motion to pass the Amendment Bill. As aforementioned, politicians regarded HK’s 
Octopus card as the world’s most successful smart card operation at the time, in which 
Sydney would “do well to emulate” (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p.20808). The 
Octopus card was infamous since its launch in 1997 and for its massive uptake by three 
million users in the first three months (Banerjee et al. 2008, p.116). By 2008, about 17 
million cards were in circulation (Ibid). The impressive results of the Octopus card 
certainly contributed to the optimistic and ambitious expectations of emulating such a 
high revenue-generating product, which would also make public transport more 
attractive. The Amendment Bill was a necessary step in enabling a successful transfer of 
HK’s Octopus card (NSW Legislative Assembly 2006, p. 20808).  
 
The Department was also entering into a contract with ERG for this delivery – the 
same company that delivered HK’s Octopus. There was firm belief that ERG would 
provide the same result as it did in HK, allowing Sydney’s Tcard to also be used “in 
parking meters, vending machines, public leisure facilities or at various merchants... to 
introduce a cashless item for daily purchases” (Ibid). The motivation on the politicians’ 
side reiterates an acknowledgement of the need to upgrade Sydney transport and 
modernize it under socioeconomic and international pressures, but also for high revenue 
generation (Ibid). 
 
On the other hand, the actors who demanded a smartcard and advocated it in the 
first place were mostly lobby groups such as the APT, research institutions and 
consulting groups. Key papers and researchers include Stewart Smith, Gary Glazebrook, 
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The Sydney Morning Herald, Allan Smith from APT, Professor Newman and UITP just 
to name a few. The composition of the PTTC board members were not representative of 
the public, were very closely affiliated with public transport operators, and were wholly 
under the direction of the Minister. As mentioned in the previous chapter any other 
entities beyond the Minister could not access the PTTC, thus there was no chance of 
going back and re-designing the policy to address fares (APT 2006).  
 
Parallel to what was revealed using Patashnik’s framework, evidence used in PTF 
showed that the elected officials were the main decision-makers and designers of the 
Tcard. They were responsible for the failure of implementation by leaving legacy fares 
and transport authorities’ structures in place. Additionally, PTF explored further the 
voluntary nature of the politicians’ motives, however it is still not able to explain why 
exactly the Minister had decided not to reform fares and reorganise the transport 
operators. The possibility that politicians were primarily concerned with electoral voting 
interests, leading to severe policy myopia, as accused by APT and ERG will be further 
discussed at the end of the chapter.  
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3.5 What is Transferred?  
 
This question assesses whether the whole policy package; policy goals, content, 
instruments, programs and negative lessons were transferred or not. This helps confirm 
the significance of a single transport authority with power to decide fare structure.  
 
3.5A Policy Goal 
 
HK’s purpose, like Sydney’s, was to alleviate the population and environmental 
sustainability problem. It was an urgent, high priority for the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region government (HKSAR) to provide an efficient and attractive public 
transport service (Yuen 2005, p.6).  
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and the previous one, the Tcard was 
designed to upgrade public transport, making it a more attractive mode of transport. This 
aspect of the policy goal is part of the voluntary adoption of PT, but with perceived 
necessity. However for Sydney, another major element of the policy goal was to make 
revenue, and commercialise the Tcard to spread to the retail sector and copy HK in 
upgrading into a cashless society. MP Steven Chaytor stated: 
“An integrated smart card presents the opportunity to increase revenue 
collections and decrease costs…the Tcard system will have an additional 
benefit for public transport if the new corporation realises the commercial 
benefits of the Tcard as a widely used cash-card” (NSW Legislative Assembly 
2006, p.20808).  
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While the revenue aspect of the policy goal is not absent for HK either, it was less 
of a focus as HK never deliberately intended the Octopus card to spark such an extensive 
cashless phenomenon. It was only later in 2000 when Octopus Cards Limited applied for 
a special purpose deposit-taking company authorisation from the HK Monetary authority 
to extend its commercial outreach beyond the transportation industry (Li 2008, p.2-3). 
However again, this research presents no evidence that this aspect of desiring high 
revenues as a part of the driving factor for adopting a Tcard led to its failure. 
 
3.5B Institutions 
 
In 1994, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC), the Kowloon-Canton 
Railway Corporation (KCRC), Kowloon Motor Bus Company, Citybus and New World 
First Bus established a private company, Creative Star Limited (renamed Octopus Cards 
Limited in 2002) to develop the Octopus card (Ibid). Both MTRC and KCRC operated 
under commercial principles and HKSAR was no longer the decision maker (Ibid). The 
transport operators that made up Creative Star Ltd had the autonomy to determine fare 
structures (Ibid; Yuen 2005, p.24). While they had the obligation to consult the 
Legislative Council Panel on Transport, the Transport Advisory Committee and finally 
the District Councils about any fare reforms, it was up to the companies themselves to 
decide whether or not they should take the advice (Ibid). This is a major differentiating 
factor between HK and Sydney. The PTTC was supposed to be the parallel organisation 
to Creative Star Ltd. As highlighted in the previous chapter, findings showed that the 
PTTC was powerless and layered on top of a pre-existing messy, uncoordinated structure 
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of transport operators and fare systems. The PTTC’s distribution of power was not to 
overlap and interrupt pre-existing ones. This absence of a single authority that had the 
power to make decisions on fares is a crucial policy element Sydney missed.  
 
ERG was contracted to develop the Octopus system and successfully did so in 
three years (McDonald 2006, p.6). In the first three months of the Octopus launch, three 
million cards were sold (Banerjee et al. 2008, p.116). With such a successful uptake, the 
company then took commercial opportunities beyond public transport and changed 
company names in 2002 to Octopus Cards Ltd and then Octopus Holdings Limited in 
2005 (Li, 2008, p.2-5). All public transport modes (train, tram, subway, bus, taxi, ferry) 
and over 2000 services including convenience stores, supermarkets, fast-food restaurants, 
car parks, service stations, vending machines, access cards to buildings now use the 
Octopus (Ibid, p.9; Smart Card Alliance 2003, p.7). Furthermore, mobile phone covers, 
wrist watches and key chains embedded with the Octopus chip are available, 
rechargeable and function exactly like the card (Ang 2011).   
 
The common elements between HK and Sydney were motives, as both cities 
wanted to upgrade their transport systems and boost patronage. The same company ERG, 
was also contracted to deliver the smartcard system. However, the factors Sydney failed 
to transfer were crucial. First, STA, Sydney Ferries and RailCorp did not collaborate to 
establish a streamlined bureaucratic institution. Second, the new organisation that was 
created – the PTTC – was an isolated body to the existing transport operators, stripped of 
any decision-making powers over fares or policy design. The problem was inherently an 
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institutional matter. While Patashnik’s framework helped discover this problem through 
examining and mapping out pre-existing structures: what needed to be destroyed and 
what needed to be created anew – by using PTF I arrive at the same finding through 
comparing what HK did, that Sydney did not transfer.  
 
3.5C Content 
 
HK public transport generally uses two main fare structures. The first is flat fares 
used by buses. This is very simple and straightforward, designed for metropolitan short 
routes. The second fare structure is distance-based, meaning that people who travel 
longer distances would pay higher fares. It consists of two components; the boarding 
charge and distance charge (Liu 2004, p.13). HK’s two railway companies, KCRC and 
MTRC, use distance-based fares (Yuen 2005, p.81). While the operators within the single 
transport authority compete for the same customers, according to an Octopus 
spokesperson, they “have all worked together to ensure a seamless payment system” 
(Williams 2008). Another important point is that HK’s fare structure was simpler than 
Sydney’s and simple enough for smartcard technology to be introduced (Baker 2007). 
Transport expert and former RTA director, Ken Dobinson said staff within the PTTC 
were frustrated that the Tcard was trying to achieve too much, with too many variations. 
“If they simplified it, we would have it earlier…It's even more important to rationalise 
the fare system than it is to introduce the Tcard” (Ibid). 
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In a submission to the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), 
freight transport services provider Ian Page stated that the obstacles preventing the Tcard 
implementation were obvious: 
“The difficulties in delivering this technology due to Sydney’s complicated 
fare structures are well documented. From what I understand, however, the T-
Card will achieve little other than removing cash fares from public 
transport”(Page 2007, p.2) 
  
 
He further added that when considering the success of HK’s fares worked on a 
flat-fare system on buses and ferries, “even to achieve this and keep the system cheap 
will require significant fare reform. Unfortunately neither Government nor opposition 
parties in this NSW have even raised this. Opportunities lost” (Page 2006, p.2).  
 
Fare structure, again, is the major issue that comes to surface. ERG accused the 
Department in the Supreme Court that the causes of the delays and ultimate failure of the 
Tcard implementation was due to the Department’s own shortcomings. ERG accused that 
the Department failed to:  
− initiate or procure the progress and implementation of fare reform, despite knowing 
that it was required to carry out the Project  
− procure sufficient engagement, support and cooperation by RailCorp, the STA and 
Sydney Ferries;  
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− provide timely feedback, input and approval to the design of the Project, because it 
relied on the Operators, the Department Ministry or Mr. Watkins to review the 
design for permission; 
− The PTTC complied with a direction from (the Minister) Mr. Watkins that it must 
not consider or discuss any proposals from our clients to recover the delays (Public 
Transport Ticketing Corporation v Integrated Transit Solutions & Anor [2010]  
NSWSC 607 Sec.25) 
 
All of the points listed above highlight the inherent institutional problem of 
having segregated transport operators indifferent to cooperation, hence reforming fares 
and having a lack of streamlined administration in general.  Like mentioned before, ERG 
was also frustrated with the powerlessness of the PTTC and its inefficient communication 
channels with the Minister. It is clear that complex, legacy fare systems cannot prevail 
with smartcard technology. In a submission to the 2010 Independent Public Inquiry on 
Sydney public transport, Bob Lutherborrow, retired former Director of Public Transport 
Integration, Queensland stated: 
“Whilst ever the fare system is ‘incredibly complex’, there cannot be and will 
not be a smartcard system. There is no system software on earth that would 
accommodate the Sydney system, nor will there ever be, due to its very 
complexity. To attempt it will be ERG all over again. Massive expense. No 
outcome.”(Independent Public Inquiry 2010, p.273) 
 
He further explained that smartcard technology would only work exclusively as 
distance-based or zone-based (Ibid). Neither is it rocket science to realise that non-fare 
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reform caused this fiasco, as other countries are learning negative lessons from Sydney’s 
experience. The New Zealand transport consultancy, Douglas Economics stated: 
“The experience of Sydney’s proposed Tcard suggests that complex ticketing 
products need to be avoided: a fundamental change in technology almost 
certainly requires a fundamental review of ticketing products…fare structures 
and products need to be simplified to avoid software and implementation 
problems.” (Douglas 2009, p.15)  
 
It seems clear to others that fare structure reform is mandatory for it to be simple 
enough to suit smartcard software systems. Here, New Zealand’s process of transferring 
policy is demonstrated and its adoption of a negative lesson – learning what not to do and 
understanding the crucial elements required in transferring successful smartcard policy.  
 
Meanwhile, the Octopus card had become a somewhat ubiquitous ‘everyware’ 
technology, as currently more than 12 million transactions valued at HK $85 million 
occur each day on the card (Li, 2008 p.9).“Hong Kong isn't known for being the center of 
technological innovation but it could very well become the first cashless society in the 
world, thanks to a little plastic card known as the Octopus” (Li, 2008, 14). 
 
3.6 What are the Different Degrees of Policy Transfer? 
 
This question shows that policy transfer is not an ‘all or nothing’ process. Policy 
transfer can mean copying, emulating, a mixture of both or a simple inspiration (in 
descending order of similarity). This again strengthens the findings on what went missing 
in the transfer and what degree of policy transfer was really necessary.  
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Dolowitz and Marsh highlight that there are different degrees of policy transfer. 
First, copying involves direct and complete transfer.  Second, emulation involves the 
transfer of the ideas behind the policy or program.  Third, combinations involve mixtures 
of several different policies and lastly, inspiration involves the mildest stimulus for policy 
change (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.13).  
 
In Sydney’s case, the intention of the key actors involved in the policy transfer 
process was to copy the HK success case. However, what really happened in practice was 
failed emulation. The idea of upgrading public transport, attracting greater patronage and 
taking cars off the road was parallel between Sydney and HK. However Sydney failed to 
match the specific institutional structure of the HK case. Creative Star Ltd had 
completely different jurisdictions and structures to the PTTC, which had no say on 
decision-making processes. It is true that a policy of another country or a different city 
cannot be ‘cloned’ for simple insertion and use in another (Ibid, p.16). However, in this 
case the vital elements of the HK case were not drawn upon. Having the Minister as the 
sole decision-maker and not streamlining and reforming transportation organisations and 
fares were major structural flaws in the Tcard project, which was also identified in the 
previous chapter. 
 
3.7 What Restricts or Facilitates the Policy Transfer Process? 
 
Dolowitz and Marsh offer a range of potential constraints on the policy transfer 
process that help diagnose what obstacles stood in the way of transfer. These include 
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policy complexity, past policies, structural or institutional feasibility, ideological and 
cultural proximity, technological, economic, bureaucratic issues and language barriers 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.9).  
 
The purely technological elements of the smartcard policy itself are not difficult 
to transfer. Sydney’s Tcard replicated only what it saw from the surface of HK’s success 
of the Octopus card. The same company, ERG, was contracted and a core administrative 
organisation, the PTTC, was established. There is very little argument to excuse Sydney 
for failing to adopt a smartcard system due to ideological, cultural, economic or 
language-related barriers as ERG had delivered the system internationally to a diverse 
range of countries. However, what is revealed through this case study is that a smartcard 
policy cannot be perceived as a purely ‘technological end-all’ task.  
“Policy advisers advocated fare reform as a crucial twin to electronic 
ticketing…there are always winners and losers in a fare reform package. 
Cabinet has feared giving the bad news to the losers, and has shied from 
making important decisions…ERG has continued to wrestle with the 
inordinately complex task of writing an electronic fare recovery system for 70 
different types of tickets” (Besser and Sexton 2007)  
 
Sydney’s major constraint in allowing for a healthy policy transfer process was 
mainly due to structural and institutional feasibility. The Minister’s oligopolistic power 
over the whole case without proper policy design led to major shortcomings. Fares were 
not simplified in order for an integrated ticketing system to be a viable, technologically 
conceivable option. Furthermore, PTTC did not have the power to make decisions on 
fares nor had strong collaboration with STA, Sydney Ferries and RailCorp. The structural 
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problem behind this was that the transport operators did not collaborate in order to 
develop a new fare system and behind this also, was the decision from the Minister not to 
streamline the operators.   
 
3.8 How does Policy Transfer Lead to Policy Success or Failure? 
 
This is the most important question that rounds up the last four questions in 
particular, concluding whether policy transfer failed due to uninformed, incomplete or 
inappropriate transfer.  
 
Firstly it is important to clarify the definition of policy success that is used here. 
Some policy implementation scholars like Bovens and ‘tHart have debated the definitions 
of “success” and “failure” as being dependent on different actors’ interpretations 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p.17). However, within the confinement of this paper, I 
refrain to using the definition used by Dolowitz and Marsh; “the extent to which policy 
transfer achieved the aims set by a government when they engaged in transfer, or is 
perceived as a success by the key actors involved in the policy area” (Ibid).  
 
Dolowitz and Marsh demonstrate that there are three ways policy transfer can lead 
to policy failure. The first is uninformed transfer, which means that the transferee 
government had insufficient information about the policy, the goals, content, institutions, 
instruments, ideologies and programs involved (Ibid). Second, is incomplete transfer 
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when some parts of the policy have been transferred but some other crucial elements 
were not (Ibid). Third, is inappropriate transfer where the transferee country did not pay 
due attention to the major economic, social, political and ideological differences which 
may have allowed success in the transferor country, from extraordinary circumstances 
(Ibid).  
 
In the case of the Tcard ignominy, incomplete transfer was the main cause of 
failure. Vital elements that led to the success of the HK Octopus card include the strong, 
singular institutional structure of the different transportation operators who together 
formed Creative Star Ltd and had the power to design Octopus card policy, and make 
autonomous decisions on fares. Although the HKSAR government was heavily present in 
terms of being the largest shareholder, it still gave the operators within Creative Star Ltd 
powers to determine fares and elected officials were not the key actors in the 
development of the Octopus card (Li 2008; Yuen 2005). It is also clear that the public, 
lobby groups, the media, and transportation unions viewed the Tcard as a failure. More 
importantly the politicians on either side have admitted that the project was a ‘fiasco’ 
(ABC 2008) and a disappointment that had wasted more than AU$95 million worth of 
taxpayers’ money and time as the court case with ERG continues (Ibid).  
 
The warnings regarding the need to fix fares had been raised time and time again. 
The Bus and Coach Association (BCA) in 2007 submitted a paper titled A call for 
clearer, simpler fares – it’s time. Its Bus Reform Mid-term Review also explicitly stated 
that the government needed to take a fresh view on the smartcard project: 
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“It has attempted to fit the old business rules and ticketing products with the 
new technology and has not taken the opportunity to update its fare policy. 
This is a missed opportunity and may inhibit the growth of Public Transport” 
(Bus and Coach Association 2007, p.1)  
 
The APT also stated clearly, that if only the fares were fixed, we’d have a 
smartcard by now and the 113-page CityRail Passenger Fares and Coaching booklet had 
to be simplified (Independent Public Inquiry 2010, p.264). The largest public inquiry 
initiated by the Sydney Morning Herald, which comprised of more than 550 submissions 
from a number of local councils, the think tanks, academics, consultants and community 
forums also stated that a streamlined integrated fare was an obvious pre-requisite to the 
smartcard. The inquiry stated that the difficulty behind the non-integrated fares was that: 
“The government has still expressed no intention to integrate fares…seems to 
think its smartcard program will somehow solve the problems of non-
integrated fares, but it cannot and will not” (Ibid, p.271-2)  
 
 
Conclusion: What PTF has Uncovered 
PTF was explicitly concerned with the international nature of smartcards and was 
able to assess what the successful Octopus case scenario in HK had done, which Sydney 
failed to transfer in the Tcard case. While PTF did not directly pay attention to ‘former 
structures’, it did confirm that the problem of fare reform was related to the failure of 
having a single bureaucratic body in order to decide the fares. It also illustrated the 
specific errors involved in the establishment of the PTTC, as compared to Creative Star 
Ltd as an institution that was stripped of power and did not enjoy collaboration amongst 
relevant transport operators. Both frameworks have complemented one another by 
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confirming the key actors in the policy implementation process, the flaws in the content 
of the reform and revealing the differences between HK’s Octopus policy package and 
Sydney’s Tcard. Both come to the conclusion that pre-existing institutional and structural 
composition was critical to ensuring a successful Tcard rollout. While these answer the 
question of what led to the Tcard implementation failure, a new set of questions have also 
emerged, concerning why the key decision makers; namely the Minister and his pro-
reform Labor coalition insisted on legacy bureaucratic and fare systems. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
4.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Two Frameworks 
 
The use of Patashnik’s framework helped reveal that the failure to reform legacy 
fares was a major dysfunctional element of the Tcard policy which led to its failure. The 
assessment of the content of reform and examination of the key actors demonstrated the 
inherent institutional flaws of the PTTC in its powerlessness to reform fares or 
collaborate with transport operators. The strength of this analysis concentrated on the 
post-enactment process and diagnosed the Tcard policy of being ‘entrenched’ and ‘dug 
in’ (Patashnik 2008, p.32). This assessment certainly demonstrated that pre-existing 
structures effectively hindered the new Tcard policy to be implemented effectively and 
efficiently as a complete reconfiguration of transport operators, their powers and fares 
was essential. This chapter helped clarify the puzzle of why, even after successful 
enactment, support from key actors and stakeholders, massive financial investment and 
privileged political venues, the Tcard still failed. Although PDF’s strengths mainly lay in 
the post-enactment phases of the policy, it was also used to pay due attention to the whole 
trajectory of the Tcard policy, by exploring the pre-reform situation and content of 
reform.  
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However, PDF focused explicitly and almost exclusively on the political 
institutions and structures involved in the lone policy as a domestic case analysis. 
Although the deep focus on the domestic Tcard policy allowed for a macro and micro 
view of the Tcard policy, it did not allow for an international parallel case analysis and 
there was yet another puzzle questioning how exactly other cities adopted successful 
smartcard policies, and what Sydney had to do to copy their success. Thus PDF was 
limited in being able to fully answer why and how the smartcard worked in other cities 
such as Hong Kong, in which the same company, ERG was contracted.  
 
PTF on the other hand was complementary to PDF as it explicitly addressed the 
question of how it worked in Hong Kong. Like PDF, PTF also addressed the whole 
trajectory of the Tcard policy by questioning the key actors involved, the socioeconomic 
and political climate and the contents of the policy which were transferred, however is 
grounded on an international comparative perspective. By using Dolowitz and Marsh’s 
framework, another dimension was added to the Tcard policy analysis by exploring HK’s 
successful Octopus card. This analysis highlighted that HKSAR’s imparting of 
autonomous decision-making powers to Creative Star Ltd, an organisation which was 
constituted of the different transport operators, led to the Octopus Card’s success. Thus 
PTF double-clarified the vital elements Sydney’s Tcard missed. PTF shed further light on 
the fatality of the Department’s non-decision to leave transport operators segregated, and 
establish the PTTC, stripped of any autonomous decision making powers and voice on 
fare reform. 
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However it would have been very difficult to identify and understand the extent to 
which fare reform led to failure by using Dolowitz and Marsh’s PTF alone, due to its 
strong focus on using an international case study and not focusing on the concept of ‘pre-
existing structures’ in general. Yet, further pending questions also remain. What led to 
the merging of the transport operators to form Creative Star Ltd? And how can Sydney 
learn lessons from this merger and Private-Public Partnership (PPP)? It would also be 
beneficial for further research by using PTF to conduct a larger number of case analyses; 
for instance, how smartcard policies were pursued and successful in Seoul, London, New 
York and Paris (Edwards and Smith, p. 2). This multi-case analysis would confirm and 
map out the typical policy-related and technological elements required to implement a 
smartcard smoothly. There is also space for cross-state analysis; how were smartcards 
successfully adopted in domestic case examples like Melbourne, Perth and Brisbane? 
This may offer greater insightful analysis as there are less cultural, geographic, political 
and language differences, and could prescribe more specific models that could 
significantly heighten transport policy success in NSW. 
 
4.2 Surprising Discoveries and Further Pending Questions  
 
By using PDF and PTF, this paper has certainly pointed to important explanations 
of what led to the Tcard implementation failure. However, while that question has been 
answered, the evidence that I have explored in this paper has also raised another issue; 
one that the two frameworks have not been able to fully cover. After discovering the 
structural problems of non-collaborative and segregated transport operators, and a legacy 
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fare structure, I further questioned why key decision-makers chose not to talk about fare 
reform or merge the transport operators into one principal organisation.  
 
The public, media and lobby groups in particular have expressed major frustration 
over the policy-myopic culture amongst politicians due to an overt emphasis on winning 
votes. This is an important finding (although initially unforeseen), as it reveals a deeper 
foundational problem behind the causes of the Tcard implementation failure which could 
be viral to a myriad of other issues as an immense impediment to successful policy 
implementation in general. Table 4.1 may be suggestive of the consequences that have 
resulted from such a policy-myopic culture. 
 
Table 4.1 Hall of Shame  
All Promised…But “Indefinitely Deferred”, Cancelled or Quietly Dropped 
• Epping-Parramatta rail link • Hurstville-Strathfield rail 
link 
• CBD light rail extension 
• Fast rail links to Central 
Coast/Newcastle and 
Wollongong 
• Integrated ticketing 
(promised all over again) 
• South West rail link 
(promised all over again) 
• Redfern-St Leonards CBD 
heavy rail link (promised all 
over again), and its new rail 
Harbour crossing (deferred 
again for at least 25 years) 
• Clearways Projects, 
including extra tracks on 
Richmond and Illawarra 
lines 
• St Leonards-Chatswood 
rail quadruplication 
(promised all over again) 
• Major upgrading of Town Hall 
Station 
• North West Metro • Epping-Top Ryde-CBD 
Metro 
• CBD Metro • West Metro • North West rail link 
(Source: Independent Public Inquiry 2010, p.7) 
 
APT Chairman Allan Miles stated that there was no Tcard supremo champion 
who was committed enough to reform the fares because of fear in potentially losing his or 
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her electorate over fare prices (APT, 2009). As mentioned beforehand, the Sydney 
Morning Herald article concerning tag-on and off procedures also highlighted that 
politicians feared that travelers would complain if they forgot to pay or did not 
understand how much money was deducted (Sexton 2011). Furthermore, the Independent 
Public Inquiry inclusive of 571 submissions regarding Sydney transport had a mission to 
‘unshackle’ the short-term political interests that bound all government parties 
(Independent Public Inquiry 2000, p.1), echoing Miles and Glazebrook’s statements on 
the narrow minded and myopic views of politicians.  
 
These politicians have been perceived to have placed paramount interest in 
winning votes and possess an irrational fear of losing them. They have failed to accept 
and understand that sacrifices have to be made for the whole community to make gains, 
and that there would always be individual winners and losers. Ultimately, it was their 
responsibility to make long-term investment into better public transport for the general 
population. The Independent Public Inquiry boldly highlighted that its motivations for 
releasing such an inquiry was due to:  
- increasing community frustration on inadequate transport networks,  
- lack of public consultation, leadership and direction,  
- long-term under-investment in transport systems, a string of broken promises, and ad 
hoc inconsistent and unbelievable announcements, 
- increasing resort of spin and hype rather than substance in these announcements and 
associated justifications for successive government decisions, and 
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- absence of transparency in decisions which already affect people’s everyday lives 
and will do so, more and more, for decades to come (Ibid, p.2). 
 
The inquiry voiced an overwhelming demand for long-term commitment “beyond 
electoral cycles and short-term political expediency, to an improved and expanded public 
transport system” because people actually wanted public transport to be an attractive and 
competitive alternative to cars (Ibid, p.4). This certainly exhibits a major public cynicism 
that reveals the irony that there is a misunderstanding by politicians in presuming that the 
public want quick results and these achievements would keep them in office. These 
underlying policy initiatives have not been explored by either of the frameworks I 
employed in this paper. 
“It has been said many times there is no gain without pain…Nobody likes 
paying extra for things, but...provided the community can see tangible 
improvements…is willing to pay and there are ways to fund a world-class, 
integrated system within most people’s lifetime.” (Ibid, p.20) 
 
Reforming fare structure was an obvious pre-requisite to introducing a Tcard and 
it would have been efficiently administered through a single transport operator – but the 
decisions to do this were not made. The evidence explored in this paper has demonstrated 
that the answers to the question, ‘What Caused the Tcard Implementation Failure?’ have 
been multifaceted and also differ in depth. The evidence discovered through the two 
frameworks have further suggested that the Minister and his pro-reform coalition have 
failed to address dysfunctional, legacy bureaucratic and fare structures because of the 
core, deeper problem of policy-myopic cultures resulting from a fixation on winning 
electorates. This policy-myopia has then caused politicians to possess the mistaken 
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perception that the public wants quick and noteworthy results; at the cost of backlogging 
much more valuable long-term plans for Sydney transport as a whole. As outlined 
beforehand, this core leadership and policy initiative problem could also explain the 
continuously growing list of broken promises (Table 4.1) of project failures that the 
public must deal with. This warrants exploration into the larger, deeply embedded 
structural problem of short-term electoral cycles and policy initiatives of the NSW State 
government to explain the unhealthy communication and commitment gap with the 
public.  
 
4.3 Future Directions  
 
On 18 September 2008, the then Premier for NSW Mr. Nathan Rees was recorded 
stating, “One of the reasons we have not been able to introduce the Tcard, as I understand 
it, is because we couldn’t get fare harmonisation across the different sectors.  Well, we’re 
going to fix that” (Sexton 2009). 
 
For further research into the Tcard implementation failure, continued observation 
of the court case between ERG and the Department will confirm and may reveal further 
information on what other factors contributed to the Tcard failure and whether the 
findings of this paper were the most significant factors that caused failure.  
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Secondly, I advocate that both PDF and PTF can be used as prospective, not 
retrospective frameworks to track and forecast the direction of policies to prevent failure. 
For instance, the resurrection of the Tcard with Cubic and the new benchmark example, 
London’s Oyster Card, can be analysed before implementation to ensure there are no vital 
missing elements. I also believe that both Patashnik’s and Dolowitz and Marsh’s 
frameworks overlap in some sections of analyses, so a merged, singular framework, 
which combines complementary aspects, would be more beneficial.  
 
Thirdly, this paper has recognised the need for greater interdisciplinary research. 
Academic collaboration between the social sciences and information technology scholars, 
researchers and engineers would be valuable to both disciplines as a whole to work 
together in understanding policies with such significant technological components. This 
could allow for policy ideas and goals to be better-suited and match technological 
feasibility to generate optimal results.  
 
Lastly, an investigation into why the Department’s leaders aren’t doing what they 
were originally intended to do is a serious question that is in the interest of all citizens. 
Elected officials are supposed to represent the views of the people and deliver what the 
public need. Sydneysiders are demanding better public transport systems, with long-term 
plans rather than short-term quick-fixes which are simply laid on top of pre-existing, 
weak transport infrastructure and flawed planning. Study of the history, structure, and 
motivations of NSW elected officials could reveal the obstacles to having a long-sighted 
government working for the interest of the general public and effectively implementing 
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valuable reforms. Organisational, governance, and democratic theories may be relevant 
and particularly Sarah Babb’s Organisational Slippage2 may be a useful theoretical 
application.  Further research on this topic would help shed light into why perhaps both 
major parties – Liberal and Labor – have repetitively failed to deliver successful transport 
policies and also truly edify and constructively criticise one another in order to establish 
strong, efficient governance. I believe it is worthwhile to investigate this question to 
make transparent the motives of our leaders, organisational culture, and their 
performance so that fruitful policies can be delivered to the public. 
  
                                                
2 The term ‘Organisational Slippage’ refers to how organisations can evolve in a way that transforms its initial, core 
organisational goals to the extent that it may cause organisations to develop in ways that would surprise or even shock 
the original founders or designers. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the Tcard implementation failed due to pre-existing structures that 
were left unaddressed. Complex, legacy fares remained and the transport operators – 
STA, Sydney Ferries and RailCorp remained segregated. Furthermore, these two pre-
existing elements are not mutually exclusive, as a streamlined, unified transport operator 
should exist for coherent fare reform to take place. The Amendment Bill, which 
established the PTTC, remained ineffective as it had no power to affect either fares or the 
transport operators. It was clearly illustrated through the use of PDF especially, that 
essentially, the cart was before the horse. An introduction of a smartcard was impossible 
without fare harmonisation and streamlining of transport operators. 
 
Using PTF, I discovered that the attempt to copy Hong Kong’s Octopus card also 
failed due to an absence of a streamlined, single transport operator. In comparison to the 
PTTC, Hong Kong’s Creative Star Ltd had decision-making powers to reform fares and 
the transport operators involved cooperated to ensure that the Octopus card could be 
rolled out efficiently. While the Amendment Bill and the PTTC certainly did allow for 
efficient and exclusive access of the pro-reform coalition and the Minister, these new 
policy instruments that were designed to facilitate the implementation of the Tcard were 
  79 
ultimately void as the pre-existing structure was incompatible with the new 
‘implementation machine’. 
 
Additionally, the evidence presented in this paper also posed further exploration 
into the issue of politicians’ preoccupation with electoral cycles, which may have 
affected successful policy implementation. While both frameworks complemented one 
another in arriving at the conclusion that non-streamlined transport operators and legacy 
fares led to the Tcard implementation failure, they did not delve deeper into questioning 
why politicians did not reform such pre-existing structures. 
 
5.2 Smartcard Policy Recommendations for the Department  
 
• There must be comprehensive reform of fare structure, with the aim being 
simplification. The Department should also decide what type of fare system Sydney 
should adhere to. Options include zonal, distance-based or flat fares. In order for 
fare reform to take place, each of the transport operators must collaborate and come 
to a common decision. 
• In order for transport operators to communicate and cooperate effectively, there 
must be streamlining of organisation. I strongly recommend that the bureaucratic 
structures of STA, RailCorp and Sydney Ferries be merged taking similar shape to 
Creative Star Ltd, so that coordination is uniform and more efficient. Common 
‘umbrella’ policies should be implemented across operators and decisions on fare 
structures must also be made.  
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• Closer examination of the new policy transferor city, London, should be conducted. 
Policy designers and key decision-makers must understand the policy process of the 
Oyster card from conception to implementation including the key actors involved, 
institutions, policy instruments, public responses, content of reform – as explored in 
this paper. Simple guidelines provided by PTF may be utilised in order to assess 
whether Sydney is engaging in policy transfer in an uninformed, incomplete or 
inappropriate manner. Such preventative methods should be used to avoid making 
the same mistake of failing to transfer critical elements from Hong Kong’s Octopus 
card.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*       *       * 
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